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Abstract
Based on the specified need of the IAEA, feasibility of gamma emission tomography has
been studied for its potential for non-destructive partial defect verification of spent light
water reactor (LWR) fuel by the IAEA. Partial defect verification is required e.g. in cases
when nuclear material becomes difficult–to–access. For spent fuel this could mean e.g. the
transfer of fuel assemblies into a dry storage. The present requirement for a partial defect
method, revealing missing or replacement of 50% or more of the nuclear material, is based
on the safeguards criteria. No such methods are, however, available for the IAEA to use
for inspection purposes. The results gained in this work by computer simulation and by
experimental studies confirm that the gamma emission tomography has potential for a
real partial defect verification method for the IAEA safeguards use. An extra advantage, if
compared to the present methods used, is that the tomographic method requires no a
priori information of the operator declared data. To compare two different design options
of a tomography device, also a cost–benefit analysis has been performed. The results
gained offer a sound basis for developing a prototype verifier for the inspection use.
LÉVAI Ferenc, DESI Sandor, CZIFRUS Szabolcs, FEHER Sandor (Institute of Nuclear Techniques),
TARVAINEN Matti, HONKAMAA Tapani (STUK), SAARINEN Johanna (VTT Processes), LARSSON
Mats (SKI) RIALHE Alain, ARLT Rolf (IAEA). Feasibility of gamma emission tomography for partial
defect verification of spent LWR fuel assemblies. Summary report on simulation and experimental
studies including design options and cost-benefit analysis. Task JNT A1201 of the Support Programmes
of Finland (FINSP), Hungary (HUNSP) and Sweden (SWESP) to the IAEA Safeguards. STUK-YTO-
TR 189. Helsinki 2002. 50 pp + Annex 10 pp.
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Goals of the study
Spent fuel verification remains one of the most
difficult and challenging measurement tasks of
safeguards due to high radiation levels and stor-
age locations, which are often under water. The
increased long term spent fuel storing, considered
difficult–to–access, requires wider and more accu-
rate implementation of verification measures.
A partial defect measurement is needed to
verify irradiated fuel assemblies going into diffi-
cult–to–access storages. The current detection re-
quirement for such a method is limited to missing
of 50% of material. The IAEA does not currently
have any measurement system for routine partial
defect tests of spent fuel in storage ponds. A
tomographic method is proposed for detection of
missing or replaced fuel rods in irradiated fuel
assemblies at a level well below 50%. A prototype
is needed to show feasibility of the method in real
inspection use in partial defect verification. The
measurement time for such a method should be
reasonable and handling should be easy and prac-
tical.
This report includes the results of the joint
task studying the feasibility of gamma emission
tomography for partial defect verification of spent
LWR fuel. According to the task outline, it is
meant to support the IAEA decision-making on
the continuation of the task, i.e. whether to con-
struct a prototype of a tomographic spent fuel
verifier or to continue the task in some other
ways.
Tomographic (section) imaging method
The basic idea of the proposed methods is map-
ping of the emitted radiation by imaging tech-
niques. The imaging process consists of two parts:
1) measurement (scanning) of the object, which
results in a measured projection data set, and 2)
calculation (reconstruction) of a cross section im-
age giving rise to the detected projections. Emit-
ted radiation along different directions is detected
by a directionally collimated detector system. The
image shows a rod–to–rod distribution of the gam-
ma emitter concentration. Replacement or miss-
ing of rods can be revealed by visual or computer
based evaluation of the image. In this work, a
special scanning system with an analytical spe-
cial-purpose reconstruction code has been devel-
oped to perform the tomographic reconstructions
Simulation studies
Two model types are used to describe the whole
imaging process. The straight-line approach as-
sumes a straight-line gamma photon path result-
ing in a scatter-free projection data set. Scattering
is modeled using Monte-Carlo calculations. The
calculated projection will be the sum of the two.
Gamma-ray source energies used in modeling
were 1274 keV (154Eu) and 2185 keV (114Pr). For
the calculations, the entire geometry, and proper-
ties of detector system was modeled in full detail
and are described later in this report.
In order to demonstrate the potential power of
the method, a typical large size 17×17–25 PWR
assembly (25 water filled rods/positions in an
array of 17×17 fuel rods) is simulated, projection
data are calculated and the image is reconstruct-
ed. Evaluation of the image provides information
about the detection capability of missing or re-
placed rods as well as possibilities and limitations
for making measurements in water and in the air.
The basic idea of the technique applied in this
work is that a cross-section activity image of an
assembly is calculated from the projection data.
Calculated activity in the positions of missing or
replaced rods has a value lower than the activity
of normal rods but, in case of the inner rods, is
never equal to zero. This decrease of the activity
level should be detected.
Executive summary
8S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
To determine whether this decrease is due to a
missing rod or not is based on an evaluation pro-
cedure. Several factors, including statistical noise,
were taken into consideration. A threshold level
can be determined from the activity histograms.
Rod activities above this level will be considered
as relating to normal rods while those below this
level will be considered as related to missing rods
or rods replaced by dummies, respectively.
Based on the histograms of rod activities, two
possibilities can be considered:
• The activity density functions of normal and
missing rods can be separated in which case a
visual evaluation is possible.
• There is some overlapping between the two
activity density functions, in which case only a
compromise solution exists for selection of the
threshold.
In the latter case the probability of detecting a
missing rod and the probability of a false detec-
tion (normal rods are detected as missing rods)
should be considered. The separation of the two
density functions depends on their width. The
width is affected mainly by the statistical noise in
the measured projections.
Results of simulation studies
A water channel in the central position of the
17×17 assembly causes a decrease of signal in the
measured projection. Depending on the measure-
ment angle, an average value of the decrease is
0.5%, i.e. well below the noise level of the detec-
tion system used. By using all the measured 120
angles for image calculation, this will cause an
overall decrease of 40% in the final image. This
can be above the image noise level, if statistical
accuracy of the measurement data is sufficient.
Let us define detection probability of missing
or replaced rods in the assembly investigated as
ratio of the detected missing or replaced rods to
the total number of missing or replaced rods in
the assembly. Simulation results for a 17×17–25
PWR assembly can be summarized as follows:
• In case of a 1% statistical accuracy of the
measured projection data, the image activity of
a missing rod can be separated from normal
rods in all positions of the assembly. Detection
probability almost of 100% can thus be ob-
tained.
• In case of a 3% statistical accuracy, in about 4
inner missing rod positions (of the 25) the
image activity level is overlapping with normal
rods. Missing of rods from these positions
would not be detected. Detection probability is
21/25 = 84%.
• In case of a 5% noise level, in about 19 posi-
tions (of the 25) the image activity level is
overlapping with normal rods. Detection prob-
ability is 6/25 = 24%. Increasing of the thresh-
old, however, would increase the probability up
to 52% (13 water rods detected) but it would, in
addition, result in a false detection of 1 rod.
The high sensitivity of the method to detect re-
moval of irradiated rods can be explained by the
following facts:
• There is no need for a reference data set
because the activity map itself provides inher-
ent rod–to–rod comparison of fission product
gamma activities.
• The effect of a single missing rod is very small
to the scanning data at one orientation, usual-
ly lower than the noise level. The image recon-
struction process uses all the scanning data for
calculating each image point. Noise, the statis-
tical fluctuations in different scanning data, is
uncorrelated and the averaging effect improves
the signal to noise ratio.
Simulated data was useful in designing the meas-
uring equipment as well as planning and optimiz-
ing the measurement parameters.
Measurements with spent BWR/PWR
assemblies
A total of 6 BWR assemblies and 2 PWR assem-
blies have been measured in Olkiluoto in Finland
and in Ringhals Sweden. The cooling times of the
assemblies varied from 0.5 years to 14 years. Both
spent fuel stores, are of wet AFR design, and the
measurements were performed under water. The
tomographic measurement head was fixed on an
operator-owned device, called gamma wagon.
Gamma wagon has a fuel assembly position, in
which the assembly could be rotated relative to
the measurement head to measure projections.
Number of projections for BWR assemblies were
48 and for PWR assemblies 120.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 9
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Assembly design
Detection probability (%) when measured 
in water, analyzed using direct algorithm
Detection probability (%) when measured in air 
or water, analyzed using model based algorithm
Measurement noise Measurement noise
1% 3% 5% 1%
17×17–25 PWR ~100 84 24–52 * ~100
15×15–13 PWR ~100 96 ~80 ~100
* At the upper value  one rod was falsely detected as missing.
During the measurements, three types of room
temperature semiconductor detectors have been
used including:
• Cylindrical Si(Li) detectors.
• An array of 10 CdTe detectors, each 10 mm ×
10 mm × 1 mm in size with a 20 channel
electronics unit (made in the laboratory for
research).
• An array of 4 CZT (CdZnTe) detectors, each
10 mm × 10 mm × 1 mm in size with an inte-
grated electronics system (factory product).
Results of measurements
A sensitivity to detect any single rods was
achieved in water with all 8×8 BWR assemblies.
Normally present water rod was resolved in every
assembly. Images reconstructed from noisy projec-
tions at a high detector discrimination level re-
sulting in a low count rate and statistical noise
about 5% gave also acceptable results.
In cases of 17×17 PWR assemblies, results can
be summarized as follows:
• For a short-cooled assembly (0.5 a), the high
energy 144Pr gamma radiation was measured.
Despite pulse pile-up in the detection system
caused by the very high gamma radiation level,
all single fuel rods could be detected. All the 25
water channels could also be detected in addi-
tion to the eight burnable absorber rods. Detec-
tion probability of missing rods was 100%.
• For a long-cooled assembly (7.5 a), about 9 of
the 25 water channels did not provide a detect-
able decrease of the signal. Detection probabil-
ity of missing rods was 16/25 = 64%. The
statistical noise in the measured projections
was estimated to be 3–4%.
• The measurement geometry used was not opti-
mal: a thick water layer and a limited scanning
length caused problems during the evaluation.
Due to the short scanning length, the back-
ground subtraction was inaccurate resulting in
some additional errors and a model-based eval-
uation was not possible. Only direct image
calculation could be performed. The measure-
ment arrangement can be improved signifi-
cantly, when a more optimized prototype is
used.
• Despite the poor measurement geometry the
total number of undetected rods (9) represents
only about 3% of all the fuel rods of the
assembly measured. In addition, the low burn-
up rods and stainless-steel replacement rods
could clearly be detected.
Comparison of simulated and measured
projection data
Scatter-free projection data can be calculated us-
ing the straight-line simulation software. Scatter-
ing profile and data can be calculated either by
Monte-Carlo calculations or by extracting from
the measured data, if the measurement geometry
is exactly known. For all of the measured assem-
blies, it has been possible to fit simulated data to
the measured data.
Limit of detection sensitivity
The sensitivity limit of a partial defect testing is
summarized in Table E-I. The detection threshold
is set to a low value to limit the number of falsely
detected missing rods to the minimum (around 0).
Main conclusions are as follows:
• For assemblies between 8×8 BWR and 15×15
PWR in size, 100% detection probability of
missing or replaced rod can be achieved if
statistical noise in the measured projection
does not exceed 1%. Higher noise level will
decrease the probability gradually, but the
amount of noise should not exceed 5%. In case
of 1% noise, visual evaluation is possible.
• Reconstructed image of large size PWR assem-
Table E-I. Detection probability (%) of missing inner rod in spent LWR fuel using gamma emission
tomography.
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blies are very sensitive to noise in the meas-
ured projections. Increased statistical noise
would decrease the detection probability be-
cause missing and normal rod activities would
be overlapping.
• Evaluation of an image measured in air (air
channel) can be made only with a model-based
calculation. With such an algorithm the maxi-
mum allowed noise level is 1%.
• In case of measurements with 1% statistical
accuracy, the detection probability can be very
high both for measurements made in water
and in air.
Detection probability of different rod
diversion scenarios
The main objective of a partial defect testing is to
reveal missing or replacement of rods in an as-
sembly. The probability of detection depends on
the number and the positions of rods removed.
Main considerations are summarized as follows:
a) Rods missing from outer positions
Any single rod removed from the first two
outer rows would be detected with 100% proba-
bility. For a 17×17 PWR assembly, there are
some 120 rods in these positions.
b) Group of missing inner rods
Removing more rods from neighboring inner
positions would be detected with much higher
probability than missing of a single rod. Miss-
ing of 9 neighboring rods from central positions
of a 17×17 assembly would be detected with
almost a 100% probability. Also a smaller
number of neighboring rods, 4 or 3 would be
detected with a high probability.
c) Several single rods missing from
inner positions
Removing of rods in positions separated from
each other by normal rods can be detected with
the same probability as detection of a single
missing rod. Therefore, detection of several
missing single rods is the most difficult task
for the partial defect testing. In the case of a
17×17 PWR assembly, there are some 169 in-
ner positions. By avoiding removal of neighbor-
ing rods, some 25 single rods can be removed to
make the partial defect testing more difficult.
According to the measurements with 17×17–25
PWR long cooled spent fuel assembly, 64% of the
inner water rods (every 2 out of 3) were detected
using data measured in a very unfavorable config-
uration causing about 3–4% of noise. It means
that 16 of the 25 water rods were detected, 9 inner
water rods were not detected. This is about 3% of
the total number of rods in the assembly. The cal-
culations show, that reducing noise level of the
measurement, the detection probability would be
improved significantly. This can be done using op-
timum measurement geometry.
Design options for a potential inspection
use LWR tomographic verifier
Option 1. Transportable underwater fork
In this option the assembly is hanging from the
mast of the fuel handling machine in a fixed posi-
tion during the measurement. The detector-colli-
mator system is rotated inside the watertight,
fork-shaped detector head. The estimated meas-
urement time is about 2 × 10 minutes using an
array of about 100 detectors. Figure E1 shows a
possible schematic design of such a tomographic
verifier.
Figure E1. Fork-design of an underwater tomo-
graphic spent fuel verifier. Verifier is attached to the
pool wall. The fuel assembly is rotated once during
the measurement. Any vertical position of the as-
sembly is verifiable.
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Option 2. Transportable underwater ring
In this option the assembly is in a fixed position
during the measurement inside the ring-shaped
detector head. The moving detector-collimator sys-
tem is rotated around the whole assembly inside
the detector head. The detector head can be placed
in a location where the assembly can be moved
inside the ring. The measurement time is about 5–
15 minutes using two detector arrays, each about
100 detectors. Figure E2 shows a possible design
of a ring-shaped tomographic verifier.
Summary of cost-benefit analysis
Based on a cost–benefit analysis, an estimated
price of the fork design would be about
220 000 USD and about 300 000 USD for the ring
device, respectively. If the licensing costs of the
prototype and the training costs would be includ-
ed, the total cost would be about 280 000 USD for
the fork and 360 000 USD for the ring.
The cost of the detection unit is the dominating
factor in the total costs of the both options. All
costs have been divided over three years in the
analysis.
Verification of 64 assemblies in a campaign would
take 5 days using the ring and 7 days using the
fork. The use of ring option would be about
4 000 USD cheaper. After about 21 such cam-
paigns the inspection costs would be approximate-
ly 84 000 USD less for the ring than for the fork.
In other words, after about three years with seven
campaigns per year, the ring would become a more
economical.
Additional technical options
Adding some extra components into the underwa-
ter detector head would provide new features to
the tomographic verification system. These com-
ponents could include:
• A gamma spectrometric system either using
some detectors of the array or adding e.g. an
extra large-size CZT detector for the gamma
spectrometric use.
• Neutron detectors. The detector housing is
large enough for positioning two fission cham-
bers in a way similar to the widely used IAEA
Fork detector (FDET).
These new elements would give additional data
useful both for safeguards and for operational use.
They include:
• Axial gamma or neutron, gross or spectral,
profiles of the assembly measured
• Excellent averaged gamma or neutron data for
the whole assembly due to the fact that meas-
urement are made in very small steps (120
views)
• Azimuthal gamma profiles of the assembly.
Conclusions and proposed next steps of the project
Based on the results of the simulation and experi-
mental studies with several BWR and PWR as-
semblies, it can be concluded that the tomograph-
ic method is feasible for partial defect testing of
BWR and PWR assemblies at a single rod level up
to assembly size 17×17. This assumes optimum
measurement conditions and verifier design and,
at the most, 1% statistical noise level in the meas-
urement. Both requirements are realistic.
The method can be used also at a higher
statistical noise level (up to 5%) resulting in a
detection sensitivity less than one single rod but
still about an order of magnitude better that the
Figure E2. Ring-design of an underwater tomo-
graphic spent fuel verifier. Verifier is attached to the
pool wall. The assembly to be measured is moved
inside the detector and kept hanging e.g. from the
fuel handling machine during measurement. No fuel
rotation is needed during measurement. Any verti-
cal position of the assembly is verifiable.
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present 50% criteria of the IAEA for partial defect
test of spent fuel.
Due to the fact that the simulation results
have been confirmed by experimental results, it is
recommended:
• To design and construct a prototype tomo-
graphic verifier.
• To design the prototype based on the ring
option.
• To select a test facility, where the prototype
and the verification procedures could be used
for testing the prototype in realistic conditions.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 9
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In case of light water reactors (LWR), verification
of the contents of spent nuclear fuel assemblies is
one of the basic safeguards measures routinely
carried out by authorities and inspectorates. The
basic objective is to gain assurance that the opera-
tor declared data concerning isotopic contents and
mass are correct. In addition to correctness, also
completeness of the data needs to be verified to
gain assurance that no material is missing. With
introduction of the Integrated Safeguards (IS), in-
creased cooperation between the State systems
(SSAC) and inspectorates may offer more flexibili-
ty in carrying out the actual measurements. This
doesn’t, however, change the basic need to create
the knowledge first before its continuity can be
maintained.
Verification measurements are carried out on
different levels depending on the need. Gross
defect level measurements result in a conclusion
whether the assembly verified is completely miss-
ing or replaced with a dummy. If a higher level of
assurance of the lack of diversion is needed, par-
tial defect level verification may be needed. The
IAEA definition of the meaning of a partial defect
has been for years limited by the sensitivity of the
methods available to reveal defects. Missing or
replacement of 50% or more of the irradiated fuel
rods in a spent fuel assembly has been the defined
level for a partial defect verification method.
The limited power of the verification methods
available for the IAEA to use for spent fuel
1 Introduction
measurements in field conditions has been known
for years. The limiting factor in developing such
methods has been technical in nature. No physical
or technical principles have been known to allow
the development of a practical method for field
use by the IAEA. After years of testing and
developing different potential methods, as re-
quested by the IAEA, the only passive method
available to have real detecting power seems to be
the method based on the use of passive gamma
emission tomography. When discussing the feasi-
bility tomography, the critical opinions sometimes
heard include concerns of the expected high price
of such a method, its expected intrusiveness to the
operator and its complexity for the inspector to
use and draw conclusions. These opinions are
understandable but they may be based on a limit-
ed evaluation or understanding of all the factors
influencing the feasibility of the method discussed.
The need for a real partial defect verification
method is, however, not ambiguous.
The present task has been carried out in co-
operation with the Member State Support Pro-
grammes (MSSP) of Finland, Hungary and Swe-
den. The main responsibility of the technical de-
velopment has been on the HUNSP. The role of
the FINSP has been coordination of the task and
support to testing and developing. The main role
of the SWESP has been to arrange testing of the
method with spent PWR fuel and arranging of
alternative analysis of PWR measurement data
14
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 9
Development of the tomographic verification
method and evaluation of the feasibility of the
proposed principle for safeguards use was started
under a FINSP task in cooperation with Hungary
already more than ten years ago (1). Results ob-
tained and conclusions drawn were reported ac-
cordingly (2–3). Also SWESP has been active in
area of tomography of nuclear fuel /5/.
The overall conclusion drawn already before
has shown that the tomographic method is feasi-
ble for verification measurements of spent LWR
fuel. Even missing of individual fuel rods can be
revealed under favorable conditions. A detailed
evaluation has been requested to allow the IAEA
to draw conclusions and to make a decision to
construct a device for inspection use.
Development of the detectors and electronics
used has been fast during the last few years. The
quality of room temperature CdZnTe detectors
has enabled improved radiation detection not only
in safeguards but also in medicine and other
applied fields of science. For safeguards this
means improved technical possibilities to design
and fabricate detector systems that would be fast
to install in facility conditions and sensitive and
reliable in practical use.
As a result of the IS concept, the need to verify
spent LWR fuel during routine interim inspec-
tions of the IAEA may be relieved. In cases catego-
rized as difficult–to–access, the fuel verification
needs have, however, remained high. The final
disposal of spent fuel brings in a new category of
nuclear facilities. In final disposal, one has to
prepare for an irreversible disposal process while
the facilities may be operational for a period of
several decades before closing. To create trust of
the absence of diversion, someone has to know the
real situation of disposed fuel, preferably on a
very high level. A natural high level of knowledge,
if possible to reach would be assurance that no
individual fuel rods are missing or replaced with
dummies.
An additional feature of the security related
debate since the fall of 2001 has included a topic
of dirty bombs. Not only a real nuclear explosion,
as considered earlier, may be needed to create
instability and panic. Sub-national terrorist
groups using only a small amount of nuclear or
radioactive material may reach the same effect.
This scenario may significantly lower the required
detection level of a diversion from the traditional
one significant quantity (SQ) of nuclear material.
Paragraph 3.1 of the Task Outline, “What is
needed, why and when”, reads as follows: “A meth-
od for partial defect measurement is currently
needed to verify irradiated fuel assemblies going to
difficult–to–access storage. Current methods avail-
able are only able to detect if 50% of spent LWR
assembly pins are missing. A tomographic method
is claimed to be able to detect if 2% of the pins are
missing. It is needed to have a feasibility study,
and after that to produce a prototype for practical
use, able to do partial defect verification. The
measurement time should be reasonable and han-
dling should be easy, practical and method cost
beneficial”.
A further quotation “Consequences if task is
not performed”, paragraph 3.3 reads: “The Agency
has currently no method of verifying irradiated
fuel assemblies for partial defect with high sensi-
tivity. The tomography is a potential method to
satisfy this need. The consequence of not having
such a method would result in fuel going into
difficult–to–access storage without accurate verifi-
cation.”
The report below is written in the form re-
quested by the Agency. Based on the results
achieved both using simulation and experimental
studies, the Agency will receive all technical data
needed to make a decision whether to proceed to
2 Goals of the study
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the next step to build a prototype device.
The basic idea of the proposed methods is
mapping of the emitted radiation by imaging
techniques. The common element for all these
techniques is detection of the emitted radiation
using a directionally sensitive detector–collimator
system followed by an image reconstruction (Fig. 1
and Fig. 2). The reconstructed image gives a rod–
to–rod distribution of the gamma emitter concen-
tration of the object. Replacement or missing of
irradiated fuel rods can be detected by visual or
by computer supported evaluation of the image.
Figure 1. The principle of diametrical scans of a
fuel assembly using a one-detector system.
Figure 2. The tomographic cross-section imaging
process.
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4.1 Description of simulation algorithms
and procedures
4.1.1 Simulation model
Simulation is an opposite process to image calcu-
lation. The input is a known section image (activi-
ty and absorption distribution), the result is the
projection data set. To describe the whole imaging
process, two model types are used. The straight-
line approach assumes a straight line for the gam-
ma photon path and it will result in a scatter-free
projection data set. The scattering is modeled us-
ing Monte-Carlo calculations. The calculated pro-
jection will be the sum of these two (Fig. 3).
4.1.2 Straight-line simulation
The program calculates projections of an arbitrary
fuel assembly configuration. The input of the pro-
gram consists of
• the geometry of the assembly (rod diameter,
center–to–center distance, number of rods)
• activity and attenuation map of the assembly
including statistical distribution of both pa-
rameters
• detector characteristics (distance and re-
sponse)
• Poisson noise added to the measured value
• position of the centre of mass as compared to
the centre of rotation of the assembly.
Basic parameters and the geometry are summa-
rized in Figure 4. A modified version of this pro-
gram can simulate also hexagonal VVER-type fuel
assemblies.
4.1.3 Monte-Carlo calculations
Computer program
Monte Carlo calculations have been performed us-
ing the code MCNP4C. This three-dimensional
coupled neutron–photon–electron transport code
makes it possible to simulate physical phenomena
very accurately. The geometry of the system can
be described as precisely as required. There are
different tally types, such as current, flux and en-
ergy deposition estimators. The signal of detectors
can be modeled with the aid of the pulse height
tally. In order to speed up convergence, a great
number of variance reduction techniques are built
in the program and can be turned on using input
options. The output provides the user with various
useful information on the statistical behavior and
hence the quality of the tally results.
4 Summary of simulation and experimental studies
Figure 3. The simulation model using a straight-line model and Monte-Carlo calculations.
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Computational model
For the MCNP calculations, the entire geometry of
interest was modeled in full detail. The model con-
tains the fuel rods of an assembly with cladding,
water, lead collimator with slits and CdZnTe de-
tectors. The total width of the collimator is 40 cm,
with 100 slits and 100 detector elements placed
behind the collimators. The height of the model is
25 cm, which was proven to be sufficient by sensi-
tivity calculations.
The calculations were performed for two dis-
tances (see Fig. 5) and three assembly rotations,
namely side view, corner view and an intermedi-
ate 22.5 degree rotation. The energy distribution
of the source photons was chosen so that it simu-
lated the presence of 134Cs, 137Cs and 154Eu. Each
detector element was defined as a volumetric
photon flux estimator. The photon flux was detect-
ed in 9 energy bins between 400 and 1300 keV.
By use of a special option, the photons arriving
to the detector elements were flagged according to
the number of collisions they had undergone. In
this way it was possible to separate the photons
Figure 4. The basic parameters of the straight-
line simulation model used.
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Figure 5. Geometry of Monte–Carlo calculations (horizontal plane).
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which arrive at the detectors without collisions
(unscattered particles) from the ones undergoing
one or more collisions. Furthermore, each of the
six cases studied (i.e. each rotation and distance
combination) was calculated twice: in one calcula-
tion the lead was taken as real material, while in
the other one the lead of the collimator was taken
to be totally black (as if it was of infinite density).
After the runs had been completed, the following
photon quantities were determined for each detec-
tor element:
• total flux of photons
• photons without collisions through the slits
• photons without collisions through the lead
collimator
• photons scattered anywhere, passing through
the slits
• photons scattered anywhere, passing through
the lead.
The conversion of photon fluxes into detector sig-
nals was carried out in subsequent calculations
using the pulse height tally. By calculating the
detector response for sources of photon energy dis-
tributions obtained from the above cases, it turned
out that the difference between the detector re-
sponses for the most different energy spectra was
less than 5%. This result was obtained for the
discrimination level of 400 keV. Since the statisti-
cal uncertainty of the above listed photon flux
values were between 4 and 10%, the flux values
were taken as directly proportional to the detector
signals and were used as such.
4.2 Simulation studies with BWR and
PWR assemblies
4.2.1 Signal and background
By definition, the signal is the radiation emitted
from the assembly and reaching the detector along
a straight-line path. Its energy is above the ener-
gy threshold, and its path to the detectors is with-
in the field of view determined by the collimator
slit. The slit width is 1.5 mm, the collimator length
is 100 mm. All the other gamma rays detected can
be considered as unwanted background.
The main components of the background (Fig.
6) are the following:
• direct transmission through the lead collima-
tor (1)
• scattered radiation attenuated by the lead col-
limator (2)
• scattered radiation reaching the detector with-
in the field of view (3).
The third component of the scattered radiation
reaches the detectors without attenuation. The to-
tal scattered radiation is the sum of the compo-
nents 2 and 3. The total background radiation is
the sum of components 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
For PWR assemblies measured in water by far,
the largest dominating component of the back-
ground is the scattering in water. This is due to
the fact that the water layer between the assem-
bly and detector may be high. In many cases this
limitation cannot be changed.
4.2.2 Simulated cases
In order to determine the potential power of the
method to reveal diversion of irradiated fuel rods,
several cases have been studied using simulation.
The cases studied include the following:
• 8×8 BWR assembly with an inner water chan-
nel,
• 17×17 PWR assembly with two inner water
channel,
• 17×17 PWR assembly with stainless-steel rod
replacement,
• 17×17 PWR assembly with low burnup rod
replacement, and
• 17×17 PWR assembly with heterogeneity in
the peripheral row
• 17×17 PWR assembly with 25 inner water
channels.
Figure 6. Main components (1–3) of the back-
ground radiation.
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The last case, 17×17–25 PWR, is shown in Fig-
ure 7.
Projection data have been calculated and the
image reconstructed. Evaluation of the image pro-
vides data for the probability of detection and
false detection (normal rods are detected as miss-
ing rods) as well as for evaluating the possibility
to make measurements in the water and in the
air. Input data for the geometry have been derived
from the measurements. Directional characteris-
tics of the detector have been derived from the
detector–collimator used in measurements. Pois-
son noise has been added to projection data 1%,
3% or 5%.
4.3 Measurement plans based on
simulation
4.3.1 Criteria for detecting missing or
replaced rods
Image calculation (reconstruction)
Several types of algorithms have been tested to
fulfil requirements for imaging spent fuel assem-
blies. The algorithm developed is a special one
with main features:
• High resolution analytical image reconstruc-
tion with contour detection and with some
local tomographic capability.
• Signal to noise improvement capability by fil-
tering and averaging projections over all meas-
ured views.
• Effect of scattering can be reduced significant-
ly by separation of signals of different spatial
spectra
• Similar improvement can be achieved for
reducing the effect of water attenuation profile.
The input for the calculation can be measured
projections only (direct image reconstruction) or a
priori information can also be used (model-based
image reconstruction).
The reconstructed image gives a rod–to–rod
distribution of the gamma emitter concentration.
Replacement or missing of irradiated fuel rods
can be detected by visual or by computer support-
ed evaluation of the image.
Image evaluation
a) Visual evaluation
In cases where the activity decrease is signifi-
cant, visual evaluation of the image is possible.
This is the case for BWR assemblies, short-
cooled PWR assemblies and for detection of
missing peripheral rods (2–3 outer rows) in
any assembly. Visual evaluation is the simplest
method for detection.
b) Differential imaging
For those fuel assemblies where all the rods
are irradiated in the same fuel cycle, the rod to
rod distribution of burnup is a slowly varying
function. This means that no large differences
are expected between neighboring normal fuel
rods. In the image reconstruction calculation,
each rod is compared to its neighboring rods
and only the difference is imaged. A homogene-
ous assembly will yield a homogeneous differ-
ential image except for peripheral rods which
have high activity level due to comparing their
activity with the zero-activity level outside.
This image evaluation will concentrate on the
inner rods, which are the most difficult cases to
image. Evaluating the peripheral rods is not a
problem because visual evaluation is possible.
Figure 7. Simulated case 17×17–25 PWR show-
ing the fuel design and the position of the missing
25 fuel rods (water rods).
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The result of a differential image reconstruc-
tion will look like all the peripheral rods would
have a high activity level.
c) Fitted envelop function
A two dimensional function (surface) is fitted
on the local peaks of the image function. The
local peaks are the rod activity values on the
image. These rod activity values will have a
distribution around the fitted function de-
scribed by a density histogram.
Tools for image evaluation
(incorporated into the software)
a) Image histograms
A histogram is a density function of the image
pixel activity. Its integral is the distribution
function i.e. the number of pixels having an
activity level higher than x. Two histograms
can be calculated for the image. One is for all
pixels of the image, the other for rod activities
only. Distribution functions can be calculated
for both. These density histograms will be
characterized by a relative standard deviation,
which depends on the noise in the measure-
ment (besides algorithm and other factors in
the measurement). The higher the noise, the
larger the relative standard deviation.
b) Image activity distribution
Activity distribution can be displayed along
any marked lines on the image. Vertical and
horizontal lines can be selected. It is also
possible to rotate the image during the image
calculation, in cases other than vertical or
horizontal lines should be selected.
c) Threshold image
A standard window technique can be used for
displaying an image between two selected win-
dow levels. Activities below the lower level will
be set to the low threshold level, those higher
the upper threshold level will be set to the high
threshold level. The image is displayed be-
tween the two levels.
Definitions
• Threshold level can be determined from the
activity histograms. Modeled rod activities
above this level will be considered as relating
to normal rods while those below this level will
be considered as related to missing rods or rods
replaced by dummies, respectively.
• Detection of missing or replaced rods means
that there are rod positions with an activity
level below the threshold level. Rods with an
activity level higher than the threshold will be
considered as normal rods.
• False detection occurs, when normal rod is
regarded as a missing or replaced rod. It hap-
pens, when imaged activity level of a normal
rod falls below the theshold level i.e., when
treshold level is set too high.
• Detection probability of missing or replaced
rods in the assembly investigated is the ratio of
the detected missing or replaced rods to the
total number of missing or replaced rods.
Criteria for detection
In case a water channel resides in an inner posi-
tion of the assembly, the reconstructed activity on
this position will not be equal zero. This is an
artifact of the imaging process used. Evaluation
process is needed to determine whether the recon-
structed activity decrease is due to a missing rod
or not. In the evaluation, several factors, including
the statistical noise, should be taken into consid-
eration. For peripheral rods reconstructed activity
can be zero and a visual evaluation of the image is
possible. Histograms of rod activities are calculat-
ed and two possible cases can be considered. These
are demonstrated in Figure 8.
In Figure 8 a, the activity density functions of
the standard and missing rods are separated. In
this case the visual evaluation is possible. In
Figure 8 b, the two density functions are some-
what overlapping. A low threshold level can be
determined (see later) based on the overlapping
part and the image is displayed. Due to overlap-
ping, only a compromise solution exists. Shifting
the threshold to the highest value will result in a
high detection probability of revealing missing
rods i.e. all the missing rods can be detected. This
will, however, also result in a high probability of
false detection. In case the lower threshold is
selected, the probability of revealing missing rods
will be decreased i.e. only a certain part of missing
rods would be detected but the probability of false
detection will be decreased.
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Overlapping or separation of the density functions
of normal and missing rods of an image depends
on the width of the density function (see Fig 8).
Important factors influencing this width are as
the following:
• Inaccuracy of the algorithm (this is a systemat-
ic error),
• Noise level of the measured projection (high
noise level will result in a wide density func-
tion),
• Features of the algorithm, especially its noise
suppression parameters Several algorithms
have been compared concerning parameters
(width) of the density function. This property is
one of the most important parameters in se-
lecting the algorithm.
4.3.2 Calculated scanning parameters
The inaccuracy of the image reconstruction tech-
nique used depends strongly on the size of meas-
ured data set i.e. the number of projections and
sampling points per projection. An important pa-
rameter is the resolution requirement to see each
rod in the image. To satisfy this requirement, a
certain amount of data is needed. The number of
projections and sampling interval in the projec-
tion are related parameters. Based on the evalua-
tion process, these parameters were calculated. It
is assumed that the best available algorithms are
available and a single rod detection level is the
objective. The calculated parameters to be used
for the measurements are as follows:
Figure 8. Histograms showing a modeled normal rod activity and a decreased activity caused by
missing (or replaced) fuel rods. Figure a) shows histograms separated and Figure b) histograms over-
lapping, respectively. f(x) = activity histogram,  is distribution function, x = rod activity,
N = total number of rods in the assembly. 0
( ) ( )
x
F x f x dx= ∫
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• BWR 8×8 assembly: 48 projections and 2mm
sampling interval,
• PWR 17×17 assembly: 120 projections and
2mm sampling interval.
Larger the number of views and finer the sam-
pling, the higher the needed accuracy of the meas-
urements (geometry, movement etc.) and longer
the total time required for scanning. This fact lim-
its practically the number of projections and sam-
pling interval.
4.4 Measurements with spent
BWR and PWR assemblies
4.4.1 Characteristics of measured fuel
assemblies
A total of 6 BWR assemblies and 2 PWR assem-
blies have been measured including both short
and long cooled assemblies. Declared parameters
of the measured assemblies are summarized in
Table I. Item no. 7 has 8 burnable absorber rods at
the periphery. Item no. 8 is a 0.5 years cooled high
burnup (42.2 MWd/kgU) PWR assembly with 25
water filled rods inside. In addition, it includes 3
low burnup rods replaced on one outer row as well
as two stainless steel rods replaced on the same
outer row.
4.4.2 Experimental set-up and measurements
Hardware arrangement and data
The spent fuel storages used for measurements,
both in Olkiluoto Finland and in Ringhals Swe-
den, are wet AFR storages for BWR and PWR fuel
assemblies. Both are equipped with an operator
owned fuel lift equipment, called gamma wagon
that is used for fuel service purposes. The gamma
wagon is attached on a fixed position to the wall of
the fuel handling pond. Different fuel service fix-
tures can be clamped to the gamma wagon allow-
ing the operator to move the assembly in vertical
direction and also to rotate it manually. The meas-
urement fixture used for tomographic studies
holds the assembly during measurement. Figure 9
shows the overall measurement arrangement
used.
The tomographic detector head, with the back-
side opened in Figure 10 was attached to a fixed
position in the middle of the measurement fixture
before lifting the equipment into the pond. Fig-
ure 11 shows the measurement geometry of the
assembly inside the fixture as it was during the
measurements. The fuel handling machine was
used to transfer the assembly into the fixture.
Detectors
Three types of room temperature semiconductor
detector have been used. First, two cylindrical
Si(Li) detectors of different sizes placed in a row,
one behind the other, measuring the same point of
the assembly. In Figure 12 the size of the second
detector is in brackets. The pulse processing elec-
tronics has been developed and produced in the
research laboratory of the Budapest University of
Technology and Economics, BUTE (formerly Tech-
nical University of Budapest, TEB). Second, an
array of 10 CdTe detectors, each 10 mm × 10 mm,
in size has been used with the same electronics to
shorten the measurement time. Third, an array of
4 CZT detectors has been used for measuring the
PWR assemblies. The operation principle of the
electronics used for the CZT detectors is the same,
but it is operating in a factory produced integrat-
Table I. Declared parameters of the measured spent fuel assemblies.
No. Assembly 
ID
Measurement 
date
BU
(MWd/kgU)
CT 
(years)
Fuel 
channel
Type Site
1 9016 November 1990 33,2 3,5 no BWR 8×8–1 Olkiluoto
2 8368 June 1991 31,6 2,1 yes BWR 8×8–1 Olkiluoto
3 6130 June 1991 24,9 8,1 yes BWR 8×8–1 Olkiluoto
4 7055 January 1993 17,7 9,5 yes BWR 8×8–1 Olkiluoto
5 13285 December 1999 30,89 6,5 yes BWR 8×8–1 Olkiluoto
6 December 1999 14 yes BWR 8×8–1 Olkiluoto
7 51K March 2001 39,1 7,5 no PWR 17×17–25 Ringhals
8 15S March 2001 42,2 0,5 no PWR 17×17–25 Ringhals
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Figure 9. Schematic measurement arrangement
used during tomographic measurements at the AFR
storages in Finland and in Sweden showing meas-
urement head (1), fuel assembly (2), fuel rotation
equipment (3), measurement fixture attached to the
gamma wagon (4) and cables (5).
Figure 10. An opened underwater detector head
used for tomographic measurements of spent fuel
assemblies.
Figure 11. Measurement geometry (top view) of the
tomographic measurements of BWR and PRW fuel
assemblies. The stainless steel made detector head
was attached to the measurement fixture.
Figure 12. Room temperature detectors used for
tomographic measurement.
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ed system. Size of detectors used is seen in Fig-
ure 12. Table II includes listing of the detectors
and their settings for different measurement cam-
paigns.
Single detector scanning for detector
calibration
The detection system was moved mechanically in
2 mm steps during measurements. The same ap-
proach was used for all campaigns and for all de-
tectors. Each detector measures the same projec-
tion and scanning results are stored for each de-
tector separately. These scanning results are used
to determine the differences in the detector per-
formance (sensitivity etc.) and calculating the cal-
ibration factors to compensate for these differenc-
es. This calibration was done once after energy
discriminator level calibration.
Multidetector scanning
The detector array is moved mechanically in pre-
defined steps. Movement of the array is pro-
grammed to cover the whole measurement area
with the measurement interval of 2 mm. A compu-
ter program calculates the composed scanning file
for the 2 mm sampling. Calibration to compensate
for differences in the detector sensitivity is needed
to obtain an artefact-free scanning profile. Cali-
bration factors are measured using a single detec-
tor scanning for this purpose.
Discriminator level setting
The size of the detectors is so small, that full ener-
gy absorption probability of incoming gamma ra-
diation is negligible. Therefore, counts observed at
the compton edge are used as a signal. The energy
level threshold discriminators control the pulse
amplitudes at the output of the analogue amplifi-
er. Two discriminator levels for each detector
channel are set. The lower threshold level dis-
criminator (UD1) is set to measure the 154Eu and
144Pr gamma rays together. The higher threshold
level discriminator (UD2) is set to detect only the
gamma rays of 144Pr.
The image of the gamma rays above the higher
threshold level can be used for short cooled as-
semblies only (cooling time, CT < 3 a) to provide
images of gamma rays of short-lived 144Pr. The
image of gamma rays above the lower threshold
level can be used for long-cooled assemblies pro-
viding information of the distribution of the 154Eu
gamma-ray emitter concentration. The discrimi-
nator levels are used to select the measured part
of gamma-ray spectra. The closer the discrimina-
tion level is to the Compton edge of a selected
gamma ray, the better is the energy selectivity of
the system. This is limited by statistical error.
4.4.3 Summary of scanning data
Details of the scanning data differ somewhat for
different measurement campaigns. Table II shows
scanning parameters used in different cases.
Table III shows the discriminator levels for differ-
ent detectors and measured fuel assemblies.
4.4.4 Summary of data analysis methods
Model-based calculation and extraction of
information
The large background caused by scattering in wa-
ter and the incorrect background subtraction due
to a limited scanning length necessitate adding of
more information to the image reconstruction
process of PWR assemblies. A physical model of
the scanning process is being developed, which
provides some additional information for the im-
age reconstruction. In addition, there are several
useful parameters, which can be extracted from
Table II. Scanning parameters used during tomographic measurement campaigns of spent LWR fuel.
 Measurement campaign
Parameter BWR 1 BWR 2 PWR
Number and type of detectors 1 Si(Li) 10 CdTe (array) 1+3 CZT
Scanning step 2 mm 20 mm 6 mm
Sampling interval 2 mm 2 mm 2 mm
Number of measured views (angles) 32 48 120
Distance from detector to assembly center of rotation 210 mm 210 mm 410 mm
Total scanning time 5 h 1 h 10 h
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the measured data set. Some of the elements of
this model are introduced below.
a) Water attenuation profile
Due to the large thickness of the water layer
between the assembly and the detector, the
measured data set is modulated by the water
attenuation profile. This attenuation profile
and its correction function can be calculated if
the geometrical parameters (rod diameter,
pitch) of the assembly are known.
b) Background subtraction from measured data
After calculation, it can be concluded the scat-
tered radiation profile is a slowly varying func-
tion. Separation of it is thus possible which can
result in a scatter-free profile. Geometrical
Table III. Discriminator levels (UD) for different
detectors and measured assemblies.
Detector Cooling time of 
measured fuel 
assemblies (a)
UD (keV) Fuel 
design
Si(Li) 2,1 973 BWR
Si(Li) 3,5 700 BWR
Si(Li) 8,1 620 BWR
CdTe 9,5 250 BWR
CZT 6,5 900/1300 * BWR
CZT 14 900/1000 * BWR
CZT 0,5 1700/2000 ** PWR
CZT 7,5 400/700 PWR
* High level due to increased noise (grounding problem).
** High level due to pulse pile-up.
parameters (rod diameter, pitch) of the assem-
bly containing all the rods should be known for
this calculation.
c) Fuel absorption correction
A mathematical model is used to correct for the
absorption. Due to the instability problem, only
a limited improvement is possible. For imaging
purposes it can, however, be significant.
Direct image reconstruction
Direct image reconstruction means that the input
is only the measured data set file. No other data
are needed. The main advantage of these types of
image reconstruction is that the distortion caused
by incorrect data can be avoided. The main draw-
back of these techniques is that normally the
measured sinogram data set for such a high ab-
sorbent, like the assembly, is never good enough
for accurate imaging. As an example, a map of
attenuation coefficient (which in tomography is
measured by a separate imaging process) is not
available for the image calculation made in this
report.
Model-based image calculation
The water attenuation correction and the model-
based scattered background subtraction can be in-
cluded in the algorithm. In case of an accurate
model, the data image can be improved. Any incor-
rect a priori data, however, would introduce dis-
tortion and error in the imaging process resulting
in faulty detection.
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5.1 Simulated cross section images of
BWR and PWR assemblies
5.1.1 Signal and background
Calculated activity profiles for the side view of a
BWR and a PWR assembly are shown in Figures
13 and 14. Contribution of the unscattered and
the scattered gamma rays to the detected signal is
shown. For these demonstrations a detector dis-
crimination level of 400 keV is used.
Calculation results for a side view of a PWR
(17×17) assembly show clearly the strong effect of
the scattered gamma rays (Fig. 14). Due to a large
water layer between the assembly and the detec-
tor and a very thin collimator used in the head,
the intensity of the scattered radiation is by far
larger than the signal. This profile has been
calculated for several other views as well and the
signal–to–background ratio was found to be simi-
lar.
5.1.2 Effect of water rods on measured data
Figure 15 shows a PWR assembly with three wa-
ter channels located 1) in the center of the assem-
bly, 2) in a middle position and 3) in a corner
position. The missing rod (water channel in this
case) will result in a decrease of the signal in
measurements where its position is within the col-
limated view of the detector. This decrease will
depend on the path-length of the line along the
collimated view in the assembly. In case the line
along the collimated view is aligned with the rod
rows, columns or diagonal, the path-length in the
fuel is longer and the signal decrease caused by
one missing rod is at the minimum. On the other
hand, if the line of view travels mostly between
the rod rows or columns, the decrease is higher.
Therefore percentual changes in the intensity of
the projections depend on the angle of measure-
ment. Changes based on the simulation results
5 Results
Figure 13. Side view of a spent BWR assembly showing the contribution of unscattered and scattered
photons to the detected signal. Distance between the detector and the rotational centre of the assembly
was 21 cm.
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(see Fig. 15) can be summarized as follows:
• center position (1): 0.12…0.9% (average 0.5%)
• middle position (2): 0.12…2.28% (average 1.2%)
• corner position (3): 0.12…97.77% (average 49%).
Figure 14. Side view of a spent PWR (17×17) assembly showing the contribution of unscattered and
scattered photons to the signal. Distance between the detector and the rotational centre of the assembly
was 41 cm.
Figure 15. Simulation studies were carried out
using a 17×17 PWR assembly with three water
channels in different positions (positions 1–3).
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Except for the water channel in the corner posi-
tion, all the others are below the level of noise of a
good detection system. This is the small signal,
which should be extracted from the noise using an
image reconstruction algorithm. One of the re-
quired features of the algorithm to be used is that
it shall sum up all the projections measured at
several angles. There is no correlation between
the noise of projections measured at different an-
gles but all the small changes in the projections
are correlated and will be summed up.
Simulations have been made also for air filled
channels and different replacement (dummy) cas-
es. For air channels, the effect is about half of the
value of a water channel. For dummies it is
several times more than the value calculated for a
water channel. Generally speaking, the higher the
gamma radiation attenuation of a dummy is, the
larger is the effect on the measured projection. A
larger effect is also easier to detect.
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5.1.3 Effect of water rods on image
A decrease of the rod activity will be detected in
the position of a water channel. This decrease was
calculated by a noise-free simulation of a 17×17
PWR assembly with water channels in different
positions. The image was reconstructed from 120
views using 2 mm sampling.
Table IV shows that a water channel in the
first row (position 3) causes an almost 100%
signal decrease (signal level ≈ 0). The effect of the
inner positions (1 and 2) is smaller. It is this
decrease of the signal that should be extracted
from the statistical fluctuations (noise) of the rod
activities.
5.1.4 Effect of noise on image
Statistical fluctuations (noise) of normal rod ac-
tivities of the cross sectional image depend on the
statistical fluctuations in the measured projec-
tions and on the image evaluation procedures. A
17×17 PWR assembly with only normal rods (no
missing or replaced rod) was simulated changing
the amount of noise in the measured projections.
The relative standard deviation of the image den-
sity histograms were calculated using differential
image evaluation algorithms. Decrease of the rod
activity should be detectable if it is smaller than
threshold level determined from the rod activity
histogram. Table V shows the results of the simu-
lation.
5.1.5 Evaluation of simulated PWR images
Images reconstructed from the simulations of
measurements in water were evaluated by a di-
rect algorithm using a differential evaluation tech-
nique. The images can be seen in Figure 16 (a–c).
Three histograms were calculated for each image:
• histogram of all rod activities including the
missing inner rods
• histogram of normal rod activities
• histogram of reconstructed activity levels in
the missing rod positions.
The two last activity histograms for the inner rods
can be seen in Figure 16 (right) together with the
threshold images (left) calculated from the projec-
tions with different (Poisson) noise levels. From
the simulation it can be concluded that for the
case of 1% noise, normal rods and water channels
are clearly separated from each other. This is why
a 100% of missing rods can be detected even based
on visual evaluation.
For the two other cases, some overlapping of
activities of normal and missing rods can be
observed.
Activities in some positions of the missing rods
are on the same level as the activity of normal rod
positions. This overlapping is larger for the larger
noise levels. In case the threshold is set to the
lower value of this overlapping, some of the miss-
ing rods will be undetected but there will be no
false detections. If the threshold is set to a higher
value, more missing rod positions will be detected
together with a false detection of some of the
normal rods.
To determine the overlapping part of the nor-
mal and missing positions, activity histogram dis-
tribution functions for the two histograms have
been calculated. In the simulated case with 3%
noise level, in about 4 missing rod positions the
activity level is in the range of the normal rods. In
case of 5% noise level, about 19 missing rods
would not be detected. In case 1 false detection is
allowed, this number will be only 12.
There are several ways to find out the opti-
mum threshold. The best estimate can be obtained
from a distribution function. An estimate can be
obtained also by subtracting 3–4 standard devia-
Table V. Effect of noise to the relative standard
deviation of the rod image density histograms.
Table IV. The effect of a water rod in different locations (location 1–3, see Fig. 15) of a 17×17
PWR assembly to the activity level in the image.
Position of water rod 1 (center) 2 (middle) 3 (periphery)
Image activity decrease 40% 60% 90%…98%
Noise in projections (%) 1 3 5
Relative standard 
deviation σ/M (%)
14,1 20,6 27,6
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Figure 16. Reconstructed images for a simulated 17×17–25 PWR assembly (left). Different noise levels
have been added to the signal: 1% (a), 3% (b) and5 % (c). Rod activity histograms are shown on the
right. Dark bars indicate activities in positions where fuel rods are missing.
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tions from the mean activity level. Both of these
parameters can be calculated for the histograms
using the software.
5.2 Measured cross section images
of BWR and PWR assemblies
Three selected cross section images reconstructed
by a direct reconstruction algorithm are shown in
Figures 17 (a–c). A differential evaluation algo-
rithm was applied for the PWR image reconstruc-
tion. The BWR image can be evaluated even visu-
ally.
Figure 17 a) shows a short-cooled PWR assem-
bly. Its cooling time is only 0.5 a (assembly no. 8 in
Table I). Activity cross section images of the two
longer cooled BWR and PWR assemblies (no.3 and
7 in Table I) are shown in Figures 17 b) and c),
respectively.
For all measured BWR assemblies single rod
detection sensitivity was achieved. Images recon-
structed from noisy projections gave also good
results. These noisy measurements were carried
out using a high detector discrimination level
resulting in a low count rate and statistical noise
over 5%.
The results of the PWR assemblies can be
summarized as follows:
The short cooling time (0.5 a) of the PWR
assembly (assembly no. 8, Table I) made it possi-
ble to detect the high energy 144Pr gamma radia-
tion (2186 keV). Due to a low self-absorption and
despite the very high gamma radiation level caus-
ing pulse pile-up in detection system, a 100%
detection result was obtained. All the 25 water
channels were revealed together with 8 burnable
absorber rods.
In case of the long-cooled (7.5 a) assembly
(no. 7, Table I), about 9 of the 25 water channels
could not provide a definite signal decrease. Sta-
tistical noise in the measured projections was
estimated to be 3–4%. The geometry of the meas-
urement was not even close to optimal. A thick
water layer and a short scanning length caused
problems during evaluation. Due to the short
scanning length, the background subtraction was
inaccurate resulting in some additional errors.
Model-based evaluation was not possible, only a
direct image calculation. Despite these limiting
facts, which can be significantly improved by
measurements with an optimized prototype, the
total number of undetected rods (9) means only
about 3% of all rods of the assembly measured.
The low burnup rods and stainless-steel re-
placement rods of the PWR assembly could clearly
be detected. These items located even in the first
row made the detection of the inner water chan-
nels more difficult.
Rod activity histogram of the PWR assembly
shown in Figure 17 c) is shown in Figure 18.
From verification point of view, this is the most
difficult case measured. Detection threshold is
calculated from the mean and relative standard
deviations (vertical cursor line in Fig. 18). Using a
direct image reconstruction algorithm, the calcu-
lated activity of about 9 missing rod positions is
overlapping with the activity values of normal
rods.
5.3 Alternative analysis approach
Uppsala University in Sweden has also performed
analysis of the measurement data from the PWR
assembly no. 7 (see Table I). An alternative tomo-
graphic analysis method was then applied, based
on an algebraic algorithm involving detailed mod-
eling of the gamma ray interaction of the emitted
radiation from the fuel. This analysis is accounted
for in Annex.
It is pointed out in Annex that this method
requires exact positioning data of fuel and equip-
ment. Further on, it is desirable to involve spec-
troscopic analysis of the full-energy peak of the
selected decay. Although measurement data were
collected without these properties, the analysis
offered highly confident detection of the five ex-
changed rods in the assembly. The ability to detect
the water channels, assuming their existence to
be unknown was also investigated. Even though
the results were considered promising, the preci-
sion of the scanning data has to be improved to
result in reliable detection. This is in accordance
with the results in section 5.2.
5.4 Comparison of simulated and
measured projection results
Scatter-free projection data can be calculated by
the straight-line simulation software. Scattering
profiles and data are calculated by Monte-Carlo
calculations but can also be extracted from the
measured data if the measurement geometry is
known exactly.
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Figure 17. Cross sectional activity images of measured assemblies: a) a short cooled (0.5 a) PWR
assembly, b) a long cooled (8.1 a) BWR assembly and c) a long cooled (7.5 a) PWR assembly.
a)
b)
c)
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Figure 19 shows a simulated scatter-free projec-
tion a), a scattering profile b) and a total (sum)
simulated projection at a side view of a 17×17
PWR assembly. The projection of 19 c) can be com-
pared with a measured profile shown for the same
case in Figure 20. For all of the measured assem-
blies, the simulated data matches well with the
measured data. Simulated data have proved out
to be always very useful for planning and optimiz-
ing actual fuel measurements.
5.5 Other results
5.5.1 Optimization of measurement geometry
Noise and resolution
For imaging an activity cross section of an assem-
bly with a resolution required to view each rod
separately, the required sampling interval can be
calculated. This turns out to be about 2–4 mm for
PWR assemblies. The sampling interval depends
on the collimator slit width and on the distance
between the detector and the assembly. When
this distance is changed, the sampling interval
(and collimator slit width) should be recalculat-
ed.
The simulation results related to noise show
that the lower the image resolution, the better the
signal–to–noise ratio. This is due to filtering out
the high frequency (noise) components limiting
the resolution.
A recommended practical solution is to use
2 mm sampling interval for the scanning process.
Filtering, depending on noise requirement, can be
carried out during processing of the measured
data. The price to pay for it is that in some cases
over-sampling cannot be avoided i.e. longer meas-
urement times and/or more detectors in the array.
However, this solution is flexible to changes in the
measurement geometry. The same configuration
can be used for several geometries.
Scattered radiation background
The scattered radiation component depends on the
thickness of the water layer between detector and
the fuel assembly. The smaller this distance is the
smaller is the background. This has been demon-
strated by the results of Monte-Carlo calculations,
where the signal and the background have been
calculated for two distances between the detector
and the assembly center–of–rotation. One of the
calculated distances was 41 cm, the distance used
during measurements at the Ringhals facility. The
second distance is 27 cm which is the smallest
possible distance that can be used. There is a big
difference between these two cases as can be seen
in the Figures 21 and 22.
Figure 18. Rod activity histogram for the PWR assembly shown in Fig. 17 c) including 25 water rods, 3
replaced low burnup rods and 2 replaced steel rods. Calculated activity threshold is shown as a vertical
line. All rods are not necessary shown in the histogram, since some may not be visible at all (no local
maximum) and normal rods in two outer rows may be excluded.
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Figure 19. Simulation side view data for a long cooled PWR assembly: a) a scatter-free projection
calculated by a straight-line model, b) scattering profile obtained by model-based calculations and c)
the sum of the two, i.e. the total simulated projection.
a)
b)
c)
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Figure 20. Measured projections showing a side view of the long cooled PWR assembly (no. 8, Table I).
The measured projection and the simulated projection 19 c) present the same case.
Figure 21. Contribution of the unscattered and the scattered photon component to the total signal.
Corner view of a PWR assembly, water layer thickness 41 cm.
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Figure 22.  Contribution of the unscattered and the scattered photon component to the total signal.
Corner view of a PWR assembly, water layer thickness 27 cm.
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5.5.2 Influence of scattered radiation
to background
The background radiation profile is a slowly vary-
ing function. Using a direct image reconstruction
algorithm this profile can be separated from the
signal with a higher frequency spectrum. This sep-
aration is never perfect due to some overlapping
of the spectra. The result can, however, be fairly
good in practice. In case of a model-based image
calculation, the background radiation profile
should be calculated and subtracted from the
measured projection. The accuracy of the back-
ground subtraction depends on the accuracy of the
model used. Incorrect data in the model may re-
sult in incorrect images.
5.6 Feasibility for partial defect testing
(50% missing)
5.6.1 Influence of rod position to
detection sensitivity
The activity of each rod position of an image will
include some systematic position dependence. This
is caused by several factors:
• Attenuation of water will effect the measured
projection because the thickness of water along
a scanning line crossing the rod depends on the
position of the rod in the assembly. This effect
is at the minimum if measurements are made
in the air. Its influence will be significantly
reduced in cases where water attenuation is
compensated for, e.g. by using a model-based
algorithm.
• Most algorithms used for image reconstruction
have some position dependence features. Re-
constructed activities of rod positions towards
the center of the assembly will be decreasing
slightly. This is due to the very high self-
absorption of gamma radiation in the fuel
material. There are techniques to compensate
for this effect. The difficulty lies in the fact that
the imaging process is non-linear in nature
and any modification in the imaging algorithm
may cause unpredictable distortion effects in
the image.
Direct algorithms with differential evaluation will
result in images with high activity of the periph-
eral rods and some dependence also on the rod
positions other than the first two rows. Sensitivity
difference for detection of a water channel in the
center positions and in the mid positions of a PWR
assembly can be seen in Table IV.
The detection probability for missing rods in
the first two peripheral rows is almost 100% even
in the case of the largest assemblies. This is why
the assembly will be divided in two parts for the
image evaluation purposes. They are the outer
rods i.e. the rods in two peripheral rows, and the
inner rods i.e. all others rods. Evaluation of the
inner rods is made separately. There are two ways
to realize this separation. One is to cut out the
outer two rows; the other is to limit the activity of
the image to the value of the inner rods. In the
first case a 17×17 PWR assembly is cut into a
13×13 assembly (with only inner rods) for further
evaluation. In the second case the activity of outer
rods is at the maximum level i.e. black in the color
coded image, while the map of inner rods will be
unchanged.
5.6.2 Detection sensitivity in water and in air
Factors which have influence on the detection and
which are different for measurement in water and
in air are summarized as follows:
1. The effect of a water channel on the measured
projection is twice as large as the effect of an
air channel. This makes the air measurements
more difficult. Direct image reconstruction pro-
vides much less satisfactory results for meas-
urements in air than for measurements in
water.
2. The attenuation of water and the scattered
radiation background are missing from the air
measurements. This is a big advantage. A sim-
plified model-based algorithm can easily be
applied to measurements made in air. At a 1%
input noise level it will result in an image
quality similar to measurements made in water
at a 1% noise level and can be analyzed using a
direct algorithm. A model-based algorithm can
provide similar, good results for both cases. The
maximum 1% limit of the input noise is a
requirement for measurements in air.
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5.6.3 Detection of low burnup or inactive rods
Low burnup rods
Low burnup fuel rods have a lower gamma activi-
ty than normal rods. Examples of these items in-
clude:
• Rods irradiated less than normal rods. Gamma
activity of the 154Eu in rods is exponentially
proportional to the irradiation time. Decrease
of 66% in activity will cause an easily detecta-
ble decrease of about 75% in the center posi-
tion of the image (see Table VI).
• Burnable absorber rods. Fuel rods with burna-
ble poisons have an activity level much lower
than that of normal rods. Based on the meas-
urement made at the Ringhals facility, an or-
der of magnitude lower activity of a rod con-
taining burnable absorber was detected as com-
pared to normal rods. This, of course, can be
easily detected.
If a low burnup rod resides at peripheral position
it can be identified and unambiquously distinghu-
ished from a missing rod. However, it may be that
tomographic inspection alone is not capable of
identifying small number of low burnup rods at
center locations. In this special case, some other
methods, like weighing, may be needed to achieve
rod level accuracy.
Inactive replacement
In this case the item replacing a normal irradiat-
ed rod has a zero activity but not zero absorption.
From simulation results it can be concluded that
the higher the absorption the higher the decrease
of the activity level (signal). Detection of fresh fuel
rod is the easiest case to reveal. A stainless steel
dummy in the center position of a 17×17 fuel as-
sembly will also cause a large signal, which can
easily be detected even by visual evaluation of the
image.
5.6.4 Absorption and path length
The most important physical parameter, which
limits the application of this imaging technique
for verification purposes, is the product of the ab-
sorption coefficient of the detected gamma radia-
tion in the fuel assembly and the maximum path
length of the scanning line in the assembly (µl)max.
It reaches its maximum value when a narrow
scanning line is crossing the diameter of all the
rods in a row. This is a theoretical parameter due
to the fact that the scanning line has a finite width
(determined by the collimator) and the maximum
path length will be shorter than it is in the case of
a narrow line. This parameter is, however, useful
in comparing measurement possibilities with dif-
ferent fuel types. The lower this product is the
better is the result. It is also true that for assem-
blies with the same (µl)max value, the results are
similar.
5.6.5 Measurement time and noise
Based on measurements and simulations it can be
concluded that the level of statistical noise in the
measured projection plays a very significant role
in the detection probability of missing or replaced
rods. At the 1% noise level missing of a single rod
can be detected even for the inner rods. At the
level of 5%, the majority of the missing inner rods
can not be detected at all. The most important
parameters, which determine the level of statisti-
cal fluctuations, are the following:
• Activity of the fuel assembly. This can not be
changed. Measurement of fuel assemblies with
long cooling-times require longer measurement
times.
• Count-rate of detected gamma photons. De-
creasing the discrimination level would in-
crease count-rate. Separation of the 154Eu gam-
ma rays from the 137Cs gamma rays limits the
use of this method. Widening the collimator
slits would increase the count-rate, but de-
grade spatial resolution.
• Measurement (integration) time. With the de-
tection system used in this work, the integra-
tion time was fixed to 2 seconds. Increasing
this value by a factor of 4 results in decreasing
the statistical noise by a factor of 2.
Table VI. Influence of the relative rod activity to the image activity at different positions of a PWR fuel
assembly (see Fig. 15 for details of position).
Relative rod activity 0 0,66 0,9
Decrease of image activity from 
reconstructed activity of normal rod
Position 1 (center) 100% 75% 25%
Position 2 (middle) 100% 80% 40%
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5.6.6 Detection probability of a missing or
replaced rod for different fuel sizes
Sensitivity limit of partial defect testing for differ-
ent fuel types is summarized in Table VIII. The
detection threshold is set to a low value to limit
the probability of false detection to 0. Main con-
clusions are as follows:
• For assemblies with size from 8×8 BWR to
15×15 PWR, 100% detection probability of a
missing rod can be achieved if the statistical
noise in the measured projections does not
exceed 1%. Higher noise levels will gradually
decrease detection efficincy. In any case, noise
should not exceed 5%, otherwise direct image
reconstruction technique can not be used. In
case of 1% noise, even a visual evaluation is
possible.
• The large size PWR assemblies are very sensi-
tive to noise in the measured projections. High-
er statistical noise will decrease the detection
probability because missing and normal rod
activities are overlapping.
• Evaluation of an image measured in air (air
channel) can be made only with model-based
calculations. For this algorithm the maximum
allowed noise level is around 1%. Above that
level the image will be very noisy.
• In case of measurements with a 1% statistical
accuracy, the detection probability is very high
and similar both for the measurements made
in water and in air.
Table VII. Physical parameters that influence the imaging possibility of different fuel types.
Table VIII. Summary of detection probability (%) of missing inner rods for different PWR fuel types.
Fuel type Pellet diameter 
(mm)
Rod outer 
diameter (mm)
Maximum number of rods 
along a scanning line
(µl)max
BWR 8×8 8,36 9,5 8 7,14
PWR 17×17 8,19 9,5 17 15
VVER 440 7,59 9,1 13 10,8
Assembly type Measurement in water¹ Measurement in air or in water ²
Measurement noise 1% 3% 5% 1%
17×17–25 PWR ~100% 84% 24–52% ³ ~100%
15×15–13 PWR ~100% 96% ~80% ~100%
¹ direct algorithm
² model based algorithm
³ at the upper value one rod was falsely detected as missing
5.6.7 Detection probability for different
configurations
The objective of a partial defect testing is to detect
removal of fuel rods in fuel assemblies. Detection
probability depends on the number and positions
of rods removed. The main considerations are
summarized in the following.
Removing rods from outer positions
Any single rod removed from the first two outer
rows will be detected with 100% probability. For a
17×17 PWR assembly there are about 120 rods in
these positions.
Removing a group of inner rods
Removing more than one rod from neighboring
inner positions will be detected with much higher
probability than a single rod. Missing of 9 rods
from the central positions of a17×17 assembly can
be detected with almost a 100% probability. A
missing smaller group of rods, represented by Fig-
ures 23 d–e, can also be detected with a high prob-
ability.
Removing of several single rods from inner
positions
Missing rods in positions separated from each oth-
er by normal rods can be detected with the same
probability as detection of a missing single rod.
Therefore, detection of several missing single rods
is the most difficult task for partial defect verifi-
cation of spent fuel.
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In the case of a 17×17 PWR assembly, there are
some 169 inner positions. To avoid removing of
neighboring rods, about 25 single rods can be re-
moved to make the partial defect testing more
difficult. According to the measurements with a
17×17 spent fuel assembly (see paragraph 4.2)
about 64% of missing inner rods, i.e. every second
or third inner rod was detected using data meas-
ured under non-optimum conditions including
about 4% of noise. It means that 16 of the removed
25 rods were detected and 9 remained undetected,
which is about 3% of the total number of rods. By
using an optimum geometry and/or by reducing
the noise level, this figure can be improved signifi-
cantly.
Figure 23. Diversion scenarios to remove irradiated fuel rods from PWR and BWR assemblies..
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Feasibility of the implementation of a tomograph-
ic spent fuel verifier depends not only in the de-
tection power of the method but also realization
and engineering of the device itself at nuclear fa-
cilities. Based on the experience gained in devel-
oping and implementing several spent fuel verifi-
cation methods in different countries and differ-
ent types of nuclear facilities, two basic engineer-
ing options have been developed and evaluated.
The first method is called a fork option resem-
bling the wide used fork detector of the IAEA. The
other option is called a ring option.
6.1 Transportable underwater fork
In this option the assembly is hanging from the
mast of the fuel handling machine in a fixed posi-
tion during the measurement. The detector–colli-
mator system is rotated inside the watertight,
fork-shaped detector head. The measurement time
is about 2 × 10 minutes using an array of about
100 detectors. Figure E1 (executive summary)
shows a possible schematic design of such a tomo-
graphic verifier. Figure 24 shows the same option
with a bit more in detail.
The main disadvantage of this arrangement is
that one has to measure the assembly twice in
order to scan over 360 degrees. In practice this
means moving the assembly inside the fork for
measuring the first half of the assembly. After
that the assembly is moved out, rotated 180 de-
grees and moved in again for measurement of the
second half. Exact positioning of the assembly
during measurements needs to be secured me-
6 Design options for tomographic
spent fuel verifier
Figure 24. Schematic fork-design of a tomograph-
ic spent fuel verifier showing the mast of the fuel
handling machine (1), the fuel assembly during
measurement (2), the detector head (3), the stand
of the detector head (4) and the pool wall (5).
chanically. A possible advantage could be that the
use of the method is similar to the use of the IAEA
fork detector that is familiar to many operators.
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6.2 Transportable underwater ring
In this option the assembly is in a fixed position
during the measurement inside the ring-shaped
detector head. The moving detector–collimator
system is rotated around the whole assembly in-
side the detector head. The detector head can be
placed into a location where the assembly can be
moved inside the ring. The measurement time is
about 5–15 minutes using two detector arrays
each about 100 detectors. Figure E2 shows a pos-
sible design of a ring-shaped tomographic verifier.
Figure 25 shows again the same option but with a
bit more in detail.
In principle, the ring detector could be placed
where ever the fuel assemblies can be moved
inside the detector ring. One possibility could be
to locate the detector above the rack in the fuel
pool and lift the assembly partly inside the detec-
tor for measurement using the fuel handling ma-
chine. This approach would allow measurement of
any vertical position of the assembly. Another
option is to attach the detector on the pool wall
and move assemblies inside the ring for measure-
ment. During measurement the double array of
detectors and collimators inside the water tight
housing is rotated over 360 degrees around the
measured assembly. The weight of such a detector
Figure 25. Schematic ring-design of a tomo-
graphic spent fuel verifier showing the fuel
handling machine (1), the fuel assembly during
measurement (2), the detector head (3), a cable to
the measurement electronics (4), the electronics
and control of the measurement system (5), the
pool wall (6) and the storage rack (7).
would be about 170 kg. The measurement time for
one cross section is about 5–15 minutes.
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7.1 Hardware
The hardware system of a tomographic verifier
consists of the following components:
• A notebook PC to control the measurement and
to evaluate the data.
• A docking station with commercially available
computer cards. A stepper card is needed to
control the stepping motors used for rotation
and linear movement of the detector system.
• Motor drivers for stepping motors (commer-
cially available).
• A gamma radiation detection unit. The unit
consists of an array of room temperature semi-
conductor detectors with integrated electron-
ics. The output of this unit is directly connected
to the computer via a standard RS 232C or
USB port.
• Stepping motors for rotation of the spent fuel
assembly or the detection head and linear
movement of the detectors (fork).
• A watertight underwater cable.
A block diagram for each of the two options is
shown in Figures 26 and 27.
In principle, the basic features of the control
units used are identical for both systems. There
are, however, certain differences. The fork option
has one radiation detection unit where detectors
are in an array with a spacing of 4 mm. The
measurement requires 2 mm sampling. With the
fork option one has to move the collimator–detec-
tor system with steps of 2 mm to satisfy the
sampling requirement. The fork option measure-
ment cycle is as follows:
• measurement
• 2 mm linear movement of detector system
forward
• measurement
• rotation of the detector system
• measurement
• linear movement of detector system backward
• measurement, etc.
7 Functional features of a
tomographic verifier
Figure 26. A block diagram of the electric and
electronic control system supporting the tomo-
graphic spent fuel verifier fork option.
Figure 27. A block diagram of the electric and
electronic control system supporting the tomo-
graphic spent fuel verifier ring option.
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The linear movement needs an additional motor
unit in the fork option. The required extra move-
ment will increase measurement time somewhat.
Both motors are inside the detector head.
In the ring option there is no need for any
linear movement because the system includes two
detection units on opposite sides of the measured
assembly. Slits are shifted in order to measure
different lines by the opposing detectors. Rotation
of each array by 360 degrees will result in a scan
at every 4 mm. In total, this results in the re-
quired 2 mm sampling. The motor for rotation of
the detection system is inside the detection head.
7.2 Software
Two software packages are needed to use the
tomographic spent fuel verifier. Fist, the control
software is needed for controlling the measure-
ment and the data collection. The measurement
phase can be fully automated. Second, the image
reconstruction and evaluation software is needed.
The results calculation phase can also be fully
automated. There are several data output options
available to facilitate better interpretation and
understanding of the final results obtained. Cross-
sectional images as well as documented results of
missing rods are available. The same notebook PC
can be used for both software packages.
7.3 Operating procedures
The operating procedure for carrying out a partial
defect verification of spent fuel assemblies con-
sists of the following steps:
• check the functionality of the verifier
• install the verifier to the measurement posi-
tion e.g. in the storage pool
• calibrate the equipment, if necessary (dicrimi-
nator level settings etc.)
• select the first fuel assembly and move it
inside the measurement head
• make scanning measurements
• repeat measurements with other assemblies
• dismount the verifier, decontaminate and move
into the storage box or location, as needed
• evaluate the measurement data and interpret
the results.
The verification procedure is rather straightfor-
ward. It is the ease of operation and limited spent
fuel handling that have guided the development
work of the tomographic verifier concept. In gen-
eral, the procedures are the same for verifying
both BWR and PWR assemblies.
When using the fork option to measure PWR
assemblies, the data collection must be repeated
because only 270 degrees can be measured during
one scanning and all sides of the assembly, 360
degrees, need to be measured.
For the ring option, only one fuel movement is
needed to carry out the measurement. This may
include either moving the assembly into the ring
or partially raising the assembly inside the ring.
All the views, over 360 degrees, can be measured
during one scanning cycle. Typical measurement
times, excluding the fuel handling, for the large
PWR assemblies are 5–10 minutes using the the
ring option and 10–20 minutes using the fork
option, respectively. The measurement time de-
pends on the required accuracy (statistical noise).
Higher accuracy requires longer measurement
times. In general, smaller assemblies in diameter
need shorter measurement times than larger as-
semblies.
7.4 Additional technical options
Adding some extra components into the underwa-
ter detector head would provide new features to
the tomographic verification system. These com-
ponents could include:
• A gamma spectrometric system either using
some detectors of the array or adding e.g. an
extra large-size CZT detector for the gamma
spectrometric use.
• Neutron detectors. The detector housing is
large enough for positioning two fission cham-
bers in a way similar to the widely used IAEA
Fork detector (FDET).
These new elements would give additional data
useful both for safeguards and for operational use.
They include:
• Axial gamma or neutron, gross or spectral,
profiles of the assembly measured.
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• Excellent averaged gamma or neutron data for
the whole assembly due to the fact that meas-
urement are made in very small steps (120
views).
• Radial gamma profiles of the assembly.
In many cases spent fuel ponds are provided with
operator owned equipment for fuel testing or
maintenance. As an example, in Finland and in
Sweden each BWR plant and AFR storage is
equipped with a so-called gamma wagon to hold
and rotate fuel assemblies in a special fixture. The
gamma wagon is attached to the wall of the pool.
These gamma wagons can be used technically to
support also a tomographic verifier. Use of the
existing equipment and possibilities would reduce
costs of the method.
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Traditional cost–benefit analysis may not be ap-
propriate in the safeguards use because many of
the costs and benefits related to safeguards are
non-quantifiable in nature. One can not give a
price to a credible conclusion of the non-diversion
of nuclear material. Also the costs associated with
the inability to draw such a conclusion are non-
quantifiable.
8.1 Methods considered
According to the safeguards criteria of the IAEA,
the partial defect test for spent fuel assemblies
should be able to detect if half or more of the fuel
rods have been removed and possibly replaced by
dummies. The possibilities to use or to develop
Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device (DCVD), Fork
detector (FDET), Enhanced FDET, Safeguards
MOX Python (SMOPY) and High Energy Gamma
Emission Tomography for partial defect test de-
vice are compared in Table IX.
The DCVD can not distinguish spent fuel rods
from activated steel structures (dummies) because
the detected Cerenkov light is not spent fuel
specific. This is a basic limitation concerning veri-
fication of spent fuel. The fuel assembly types
whose top part structure is closed can not, even in
principle, be verified with the DCVD on the par-
tial defect level. The DCVD is under further
development and may in the future offer addition-
al features for verification of fuel assemblies
which are not covered. It may also be impossible
to verify assemblies with partial length fuel rods
with the DCVD. Because of the nature of the
physical principle applied and the limited usabili-
ty, the DCVD is not considered as a potential
partial defect test method in the analysis below.
The IAEA needs an operator independent par-
tial defect method. Using of operator declared
data for partial defect analysis should be avoided
because the diversion of fuel rods could be covered
by an intelligent falsification of the operator de-
clared data. This excludes the fork methods and
the SMOPY device. Concerning the fork detector
methods (FDET), there are configurations with
50% removed pins which can not be detected
using the neutrons vs. gross gamma curve (4).
High Energy Gamma Emission Tomography,
possibly complemented by weighing the assem-
blies is the only known passive method, which has
potential to be developed for a reliable partial
defect testing of spent LWR fuel. The tomographic
method has no inherent deficiencies in verifying
all possible cases of fuel items without need for
operator declared data. This is why the cost–
benefit analysis has been carried out including
only the fork and ring design options of the
tomographic device included in the report.
8.2 Comparison of tomographic fork
and ring options
The following cost–benefit analysis considers the
case that the operator transfers spent LWR fuel
assemblies from a storage position to a difficult–
to–access storage. The partial defect verification
is carried out by the IAEA during the transfer
operation. It is important to notice that the costs
are only rough estimates. The costs and benefits of
the fork and ring options are evaluated and com-
pared with each other, when possible.
Mechanical hardware
The mechanical support structure is made of
stainless steel. It has to be produced in a special
way. The cost of mechanical support structure is
estimated to be about 31 000 USD for both op-
tions. No quotation from manufacturer is availa-
ble. It is estimated that the underwater head
housing of the fork option would cost about
8 Cost–benefit analysis
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6 000 USD. The underwater head housing of the
ring option would cost about 4 500 USD. The cost
of the transport case of the device is estimated be
about 1 500 USD.
Detectors, collimators and electronics
A detection unit contains CdZnTe (CZT) detectors,
collimators and electronics. One detection unit is
needed for the fork option and two detection units
for the ring option. According to the cost estimates
done by the Baltic Scientific Instruments (BSI),
the detection unit with 104 channels would cost
about 137 200 USD. The cost of two units with 104
channels would be about 221 300 USD.
Cables and connectors
The cost of cables and connectors is estimated to
be about 2 500 USD. No quotation from a manu-
facturer is available.
Motors and drivers
One motor and one driver are needed for rotation
the detection system. They are identical for the
fork and the ring option. The stepping motor
would cost about 380 USD and the driver would
cost about 710 USD. An additional motor and driv-
er are needed for the linear movement of the de-
tection unit in the fork option. The motor would
cost about 260 USD and the driver would cost
about 580 USD.
Computer hardware
The computer expenses are estimated to be about
2 500 USD. The costs of the computer cards would
be about 1 000 USD. One computer is needed for
measurement control and for evaluation of the
data for both design options.
Computer software
The price of the computer software is approxi-
mately the same for both design options. The price
of the control software is estimated to be about
10 000 USD. The price of the image calculation
and evaluation software can be estimated to be
about 25 000 USD.
Operation and maintenance
The authorization requirements of the IAEA aim
to ensure the quality of newly acquired equip-
ment. The acceptance and field testing of the de-
vice are normally done within the framework of
the MSSP support programme task of the IAEA
under which the device has been developed. Other
tests like operational, thermal, humidity and me-
chanical tests could be performed under the corre-
sponding support programme. In this case there
would be no direct expenses to the IAEA. If the
IAEA had to do the tests alone, the costs would be
about 20 000 – 30 000 USD. This unfavourable
case has been used in the analysis. Due to the
rough estimate the differences in the testing ex-
penses between the fork and ring options can be
neglected. It is assumed that there would be no
expenses to the IAEA concerning the licensing and
acceptance made by the plant operators.
One training course in the data analysis is
assumed to be needed and arranged under a
support programme task. One course is estimated
to take about three days. Five inspectors could
participate in the course. The traveling cost is
estimated to be about 1 000 USD per inspector.
The cost of one training day per inspector is
estimated to be 1 500 USD. The expenses of a
three days’ training course for five inspectors
would be about 27 500 USD.
Table IX. The methods considered for developing a partial defect verification method of spent LWR fuel
for the IAEA.
Method
Burnup 
limitations
Cooling time 
limitations
Which part of assembly 
can be verified
Operator declared 
data needed
Potential for real partial 
defect method for spent fuel 
DCVD no no upper end no limited
FDET > 18 MWd/kgU > 10 a any yes no
Enhanced 
FDET
> 18 MWd/kgU no any yes no
SMOPY no < 7–9 a any yes no
Gamma 
emission 
tomography
no no any no yes
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The duration of an inspection campaign depends
on the amount of transferred assemblies the in-
spector has to verify. One inspector is assumed to
perform the verification measurements. Depend-
ing on the country, the cost of one inspection day
is about 1 500 – 2 000 USD. To take into account
the increase in costs, 2 000 USD has been used as
the cost of one inspection day. Travel expenses of
the inspector are estimated to be about 1 000 USD
per inspection. The transport costs of the device
are estimated to be about 1 000 USD per inspec-
tion.
Other features
Only the features, which are different for fork and
ring options have been taken into consideration in
the benefit analysis.
Placing an assembly into the measurement
position has no differences between the fork and
ring options from the safety point of view. The
operation can be considered as normal facility
operation for both options.
Installation and disassembling times are ap-
proximately the same for the fork and for the ring
option. It is assumed that one day during the
inspection campaign is needed for the installa-
tion, disassembling and different kind of prepara-
tion work. The measurement time with the ring
option is about 10 minutes per assembly. The
measurement time with the fork is about 25
minutes i.e. 2.5 times as long as it is with the ring
option. It is assumed that the transfer operations
take about 20 minutes per assembly. The different
measurement times have been taken into consid-
eration in the inspection campaign costs.
The aim of the operator is to transfer the spent
fuel assemblies into a difficult–to–access storage
effectively and efficiently. This is why it is prefera-
ble also for the operator that the measurement
time is as short as possible. This benefit is esti-
mated to be for the ring option 2 times as good as
it is for the fork option.
The weight of the ring option is about 1.2 times
the weight of the fork option when all components
of the measurement system are taken into consid-
eration. The transportability of the fork has been
estimated to be 1.2 times better than it is for the
ring option.
Summary
In all, the estimated price would be about
218 600 USD for the fork device and about
300 400 USD for the ring device. If the licensing
costs of the prototype and the training costs, i.e.
about 57 500 USD, would be included in the esti-
mates the total cost would be about 276 100 USD
for the fork and 357 900 USD for the ring. Accord-
ing to the analysis the fork device would be about
82 000 USD more economical than the ring device
(see Table X). The cost of the detection unit is the
dominating factor in the total costs of the both
options (see Table XI). All costs have been divided
over three years in the analysis.
The inspection campaigns are more economical
to perform with the ring option than with the fork
option (see Table XII). If, for example, 64 assem-
blies had to be verified, about a 5 days inspection
campaign would be needed with the ring and
about a 7 days inspection campaign with the fork.
The measurement campaign performed with the
ring would be about 4 000 USD more economical
if compared to the measurement campaign per-
formed with the fork. After about 21 measure-
ment campaigns the inspection costs would be
approximately 84 000 USD less for the ring than
for the fork. If these kinds of campaigns were
performed seven per year, the ring option would
become a more economical option compared to the
fork after about three years.
The summary of the cost–benefit analysis is
shown in Table XIII. It is a rough cost–benefit
approximation about three years after the IAEA
would have bought the verification device.
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Weighting
Score Weighted score
No. Parameter Fork Ring Fork Ring
1 Transportability 10% 1,2 1 0,12 0,10
2 Intrusiveness 10% 2 4 0,20 0,40
3 Costs 80% 1,0 1,1 0,80 0,81
Total 100% 1,12 1,31
No. Component
Relative costs (%)
Fork Ring
1 Detector,  electronics 
and collimator system
62,8 73,7
2 Mechanical support 
structure
14.2 10,3
3 Underwater detector 
head housing
2,7 1,5
4 Motors 0,3 0,2
5 Drivers 0,6 0,2
6 Cables and connectors 1,1 0,8
7 Computer 1,1 0,8
8 Computer cards 0,5 0,3
9 Software 16,0 11,7
10 Transport case 0,7 0,5
11 Total 100 100
No. Component
Costs (USD)
Fork Ring
1 Detector,  electronics 
and collimator system
137 200 221 300
2 Mechanical support 
structure
31 000 31 000
3 Underwater detector 
head housing
6 000 4 500
4 Motors 640 380
5 Drivers 1290 710
6 Cables and connectors 2 500 2 500
7 Computer 2 500 2 500
8 Computer cards 1 000 1 000
9 Software 35 000 35 000
10 Transport case 1 500 1 500
11 Total  costs 218 630 300 390
No. Component
Relative costs (%)
Fork Ring
1 Costs of one inspection day 2 000 2 000
2 Number of days per inspection 7 5
3 Travel costs per inspection per inspector 1 000 1 000
4 Transport costs of verifier per inspection 1 000 1 000
5 Costs of one inspection campaign 16 000 12 000
6 Number of inspections 21 21
7 Total costs of 21 inspections 336 000 252 000
Table X. The cost estimates of different compo-
nents of the fork and ring options in USD.
Table XI. The relative costs of different compo-
nents of the fork and ring options in %.
Table XII. The cost estimates in USD for an inspection campaign using the fork and the ring option.
Table XIII. Summary of costs and benefits after three years of inspection use by the IAEA. Mainly the
higher usability (less intrusion) results in recommending the ring option.
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It can be concluded from the simulation and ex-
perimental studies on several BWR and PWR as-
semblies that the method based on the gamma
emission tomography is feasible and capable for
making partial defect testing of spent LWR as-
semblies. Under optimized conditions, which are
technically achievable, even the large 17×17 PWR
assemblies can be verified at a single rod level.
This requires, among other things, limiting the
statistical noise of the measurements down to the
1% level.
If missing or replacement of a single rod is not
required to detect, the proposed tomographic
method can be used also at a higher statistical
noise level (up to 5%). This would result in a
detection sensitivity that is worse than the single
rod level but still an order of magnitude better
than required by the present 50% criteria for
partial defects of spent fuel. At the moment, the
9 Conclusions and recommendations
IAEA has no verification methods that are capa-
ble for verification that 50% or more of the irradi-
ated fuel rods have been replaced or missing from
spent LWR fuel assemblies.
Due to the fact that simulation results could be
confirmed by experimental results, it is consid-
ered sound to propose designing and construction
of a prototype tomographic verifier and to select a
test facility, where the prototype and the verifica-
tion procedures could be tested in realistic condi-
tions. For further development, the ring option is
recommended as the principle of the prototype
tomographic verifier.
According to the agreed Task Outline, the
Agency is expected to evaluate the results includ-
ed in the report and to make a decision on the
continuation of the task. The next phase would
thus be to design and construct a prototype of the
proposed tomographic verifier.
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1 Introduction
In March 2001, tomographic measurements were
performed at the Ringhals 4 nuclear power plant
in Sweden. The measurements were carried out
on a PWR fuel assembly using portable equip-
ment, which is described in ref. /1/. Analysis of the
data is also described in ref. /1/.
The additional analysis described in this re-
port has been performed with an alternative tom-
ographic method. It was originally developed in
an investigation of the applicability of tomogra-
phy for verification of the integrity of nuclear fuel,
performed by Uppsala University for the Swedish
Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), ref. /2/.
The method has since then been further devel-
oped for tomographic measurements of the rela-
tive pin power with high accuracy (1–2 %, 1 S.D.).
For this purpose, a high-precision device has been
constructed, described in ref. /3/. Having a weight
of 27 tonnes, the device is not intended for inspec-
tion purposes although it is still transportable.
Some differences are discussed below between
the conditions for a portable device, with which
the data analysed in this report has been collect-
ed, and the type of device for which the algorithm
has been developed. Also implications on the anal-
ysis are accounted for.
2 Tomographic method
2.1 General remarks
As mentioned above, the algorithm is developed for
a heavy, high-precision device. The method involves
detailed modelling of the gamma-ray interaction
of the emitted radiation from the fuel. The most
prominent properties of the analysis method are:
• A point-kernel method is utilised, i.e. only full-
energy transport of gamma rays is modelled.
• The geometry of both the measured assembly
and the measurement equipment are utilised.
The first item originates in that the method is
designed for a measurement system involving
spectroscopic analysis of the full-energy peak of
the selected decay. This is further discussed in
section 5.2.
The second item implies that geometric infor-
mation of high accuracy is desired for the equip-
ment and its position for each data point. It also
involves utilisation of the nominal geometry of the
assembly, i.e. the fuel matrix is assumed to be
complete.
The result of such an assumption for an assem-
bly where removed and/or replaced rods occur has
been extensively investigated in ref. /2/. Results
have been presented from simulations as well as
laboratory measurements and measurements on a
spent fuel assembly. (Refs. /2/, /4/, /5/ and /6/.)
Concluding these investigations, both the 662 keV
gamma-ray energy from 137Cs and the 1274 keV
energy from 154Eu should be applicable for BWR
fuel. However, the results indicate that gamma
rays of the higher energy may have to be used for
confident detection of removed rods in PWR fuel.
2.2 Tomographic algorithm
The algorithm is of the algebraic type. The frac-
tion wmn of gamma quanta emitted from a certain
picture element n that reaches the detector in a
certain position m is calculated theoretically. This
is done by modelling the measuring geometry and
full-energy transport for gamma rays of a selected
decay from the fuel to the detector. An equation
system is obtained:
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where wmn = contribution coefficient of measur-
ing position m from pixel n.
An = activity in pixel n.
Im = intensity of measuring position m.
The equation system should be overdetermined,
i.e. the number of measuring positions M should
be larger than the number of pixels N.
Generally, transmission through the collimator
is neglected and contributions from gamma-ray
scattering into the detector are excluded. Howev-
er, transmission may be evident in a relatively
light collimator and scattering will affect the
measurements if no spectroscopic peak analysis is
performed. It can be noted that both these circum-
stances occur in the measurements analysed in
this report. Such contributions may to some ex-
tent also be included in the model, but that has so
far not been made.
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3 Analysed measurement data
Measurements of the radiation field from a PWR
fuel assembly were performed in March 2001 at
the Ringhals 4 nuclear power plant in Sweden.
The measurements are described in ref. /1/ togeth-
er with tomographic analysis of the data. The data
was later submitted to Uppsala University, Swe-
den, for an alternative analysis accounted for in
this report.
3.1 Measured fuel assembly
A spent 17×17 PWR assembly of the AFA-S type,
manufactured by Framatome, was measured. The
nominal cross section is illustrated in Figure A1.
A system of coordinates for defining the position
of each rod is introduced in the figure.
The measured assembly had a cooling time of
about 7 years. It had five peripheral rods ex-
changed, positions T2, T4 and T15 with depleted
uranium rods and positions T9 and T10 with
dummy rods of homogeneous stainless steel.
As illustrated in Figure A1, this type of assem-
bly has 25 water channels in its interior, i.e.
water-filled zircaloy tubes with slightly larger
diameter than the fuel rods. 24 of these are guide
tubes for control rods and one (position K9) is an
instrumentation tube. For simplicity, all these will
be referred to as water channels.
3.2 Data set analysed
The measurement equipment and its geometry is
described in ref. /1/. The measurements were per-
formed at an axial position near the lower end of
the assembly. The gamma-radiation field was re-
corded in 120 angles relative to the assembly. This
was achieved by rotating the assembly with an
angular step of 3°. For each angular position 155
lateral positions were recorded with a lateral step
of 2 mm, achieved by translating the detector
package. Thus the radiation field was recorded in
18 600 positions relative to the assembly.
As described in ref. /1/, CZT detectors were
used in the measurements. These detectors have
very low peak efficiency, implying that the prima-
ry data mainly consisted of Compton events in the
detectors. As discussed in section 2, this is not in
accordance with the conditions for which the anal-
ysis code used in this work was developed. A more
elaborate discussion on the consequences of this
can be found in section 5.2.
To select Compton events in the detector from
the interaction of 1274 keV gamma quanta (emit-
ted in the decay of 154Eu), a lower discriminator
level was applied at about 400 keV and a higher
level at about 700 keV. However, the data set used
for this analysis was the set from the upper
discriminator, as it was considered most appropri-
Figure A1. The cross section of the PWR 17×17 fuel assembly. Note the system of coordinates intro-
duced for defining the position of each rod.
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ate for this analysis method.
Further on, the data analysed in this report
had been subject to subtraction from the estimat-
ed contribution of scattered events. The author of
this report has no information of how the subtrac-
tion procedure had been performed.
4 Analysis
To perform tomographic analysis with the method
described in section 2, detailed geometric informa-
tion is required. Thus the position of the fuel as-
sembly relative to the measurement equipment
had to be extracted before applying the tomo-
graphic reconstruction algorithm. The positioning
analysis is accounted for in section 4.1 while the
results of the tomographic analysis are accounted
for in section 4.2.
4.1 Positioning
Required positioning data for the assembly could
be extracted from the measured data set. This was
done by analysing variations of the intensity dis-
tribution in rotations about each of the four an-
gles where one side of the fuel assembly is perpen-
dicular to the symmetry axis of the collimator. In
such an angle, the projected width of the lateral
intensity distribution has a minimum. The follow-
ing quantities could be determined:
• The angular offset of the assembly rotation.
• The lateral position of the assembly centre
relative to the rotation centre in two dimen-
sions.
• The translation offset. It is here defined as the
distance between the detector transversal
“zero” position relative to the assembly rota-
tion centre and is a property of the equipment.
The extracted positioning data are accounted for
in Table A-I.
The uncertainties stated in Table A-1 reflect
variations obtained when performing multiple
analysis of the data set, varying the intensity
level defining the projected width. Possible sys-
tematic errors are not included.
The stated accuracy of the rotation equipment
was 0.5° and the stated accuracy of the lateral
positioning of the detectors was 0.05 mm. With
exception of the latter figure, the reconstruction
procedure would benefit from better positioning
accuracy.
4.2 Tomographic results
4.2.1 General remarks
The investigations were primarily concentrated on
the ability to detect the five exchanged rods in the
assembly, see section 3.1. This investigation is ac-
counted for in section 4.2.2.
However, also the ability to detect the 25 water
channels was considered of interest, as they can
represent removal of rods from the assembly inte-
rior. According to section 2, the nominal geometry
of the assembly is utilised in the tomographic
algorithm, meaning that the presence of these
water channels is known and thus, by default, no
activity will be assigned to these positions. To
perform such an investigation, an artificial type of
fuel was implemented in the software having rods
in all positions, i.e. even in the positions of the 25
water channels. The ability to detect the water
channels under those circumstances was studied.
This investigation is accounted for in section 4.2.3.
According to the discussion in ref. /2/, the re-
construction algorithm is expected to return an
activity close to zero in the position of a non-active
normal rod. A slightly larger value is expected in
the position of a rod exchanged with a lighter
material (such as a dummy rod of homogeneous
stainless steel). Further on, the depleted uranium
rods present in this fuel assembly can be expected
to contain substantially lower activities than a
normal rod, which should also be readily detected.
If a rod has been removed, i.e. not replaced, a
situation similar to having a water channel in
such a position occurs. In such a case, a finite
reconstructed activity is expected. According to
ref. /2/ also such removal should be readily detect-
ed, provided that a relatively high gamma-ray
energy is utilised.
Table A-I. Positioning data extracted from the measurements.
Assembly centre (x) Assembly centre (y) Angular offset Translation offset
[mm]  [mm]  [°]  [mm]
0.81 ± 0.26 2.08 ± 0.36 –0.37 ± 0.12 –0.76 ± 0.10
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4.2.2 Detection of the exchanged rods
First an analysis was performed where the nomi-
nal geometry of the fuel was modelled. The recon-
structed activity distribution can be found in
Figure A2. The picture has been shaded according
to the reconstructed source concentration in each
rod. White represents zero activity and black rep-
resents maximum activity.
As can be seen in Figure A2, the exchanged
rods in positions T2, T4, T9, T10 and T15 are
clearly visible. However, the relevant parameter
in this study is the confidence level for which a
missing or replaced fuel rod can be detected. This
parameter may be measured in the number of
standard deviations (S. D.) of a specific fuel rod
from the average rod activity. To illustrate this,
Figure A3 shows the distribution of the recon-
structed activities in different positions. The aver-
age activity in all positions has been set to 1.0.
According to Figure A3, the reconstructed ac-
tivities in the normal fuel rods are distributed
approximately according to a normal distribution.
The relative standard deviation is 13 %. It should
be noted that the power load in PWR fuel is
generally relatively uniform, typically with a max-
imum power load within 10 % from average. The
spread is thus larger than what is expected, indi-
cating that the precision in the reconstructed
activities of the normal rods is relatively poor.
A more narrow distribution of the normal rods can
be expected if properties such as high positioning
accuracy, detectors with high peak efficiency and
spectroscopic data collection can be realised. A
more elaborate discussion on this subject can be
found in section 5.
Anyway, the activities in the exchanged rods
range from 6.4 S.D. to 7.4 S.D. lower than the
average of the normal rods, which implies highly
confident detection. However, it can be noted that
one normal rod, in position N8 next to a water
channel, obtains an activity 4.0 S.D. smaller than
average, which could imply erroneous detection as
a missing rod. The poor geometric accuracy could
be a reason for this.
4.2.3 Detection of the water channels
The second step was to investigate the possibility
to detect the 25 water channels, representing de-
tection of removed rods. For this investigation, a
fuel geometry with normal fuel rods in all posi-
tions was assumed in the reconstruction proce-
dure. A histogram of the reconstructed activities
in different rods is accounted for in Figure A4.
The relative standard deviation of the recon-
structed activities in the normal rods is now 14 %.
The reconstructed activities in the water channels
exhibit a similar distribution, however with an
average 2.2 S.D. smaller than the average of the
Figure A2. Reconstructed activity distribution obtained assuming nominal fuel geometry.
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Figure A3. A histogram of reconstructed activities in different positions, assuming nominal fuel
geometry.
Figure A4. Histogram of reconstructed activities in different positions assuming a fuel geometry with
fuel rods in all positions.
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normal fuel rods. According to the normal distri-
bution, the probability for such a deviation is
1.4 %, corresponding to four rods in a normal fuel
assembly. In accordance with this, four normal
rods are reconstructed to smaller values than the
average of the water channels.
Anyway, Figure A4 shows that the water chan-
nels cannot be distinguished from the normal fuel
rods with the current measurement precision.
Provided that the accuracy can be improved, the
obtained average value of the water channels
indicates that these should thus be readily detect-
ed.
It should be noted that the activities in the
exchanged positions range between 6.0 and 7.0
S.D. smaller than average, again implying highly
confident detection.
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5 Possible ways to improve the precision
5.1 Mechanical features
A portable device has to be reasonably lightweight
in order to make transportation between different
sites practicable. Naturally, this implies that the
dimensions and weight of various components
have to be minimised. For instance, one has to
minimise the shielding of the detectors, which
may lead to relatively high levels of background
radiation. Further on, portable equipment has to
be designed to allow for installing and re-install-
ing of the device, which affects the achievable geo-
metric accuracy.
Still, these two items, minimisation of back-
ground in order to improve the signal-to-noise
ratio and improving of the geometric accuracy,
may be crucial to improve the precision.
5.2 Detectors and data collection
It is desirable to select gamma rays of certain
energy in the detector/data collection system. The
two main reasons for this are:
I. The interaction of gamma rays with matter
has to be taken into account accurately in the
tomographic procedure in order to obtain accu-
rate results. Since this interaction is energy
dependent, spectroscopic measurements are
clearly advantageous.
II. Different isotopes have different distributions
within the assembly due to differences in burn-
up, enrichment, etc. To avoid multiple compo-
nents in the measured data, spectroscopic
measurements should be used to select specific
decays from various isotopes.
To illustrate the discussion, an example of a gam-
ma-ray spectrum from a BWR assembly with 8
years cooling time, collected with a high-resolu-
tion HPGe detector, is presented in Figure A5.
Two peaks relevant for safeguard measurements
are indicated in the figure, namely the 137Cs peak
at 662 keV and the 154Eu peak at 1274 keV. As is
obvious from Figure A5, the large number of peaks
from different decays makes high resolution desir-
able in order to select the decay of interest.
Figure A5. A spectrum from a BWR assembly with a cooling time of 8 years, measured with an HPGe
detector. Two peaks relevant for safeguard measurements, the 662 keV peak from 137Cs and the 1274 keV
peak from 154Eu, are indicated in the figure. The peak to the right is an artificial pulser peak.
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An optimum would be to use detectors with high
resolution and high peak efficiency together with
spectroscopic analysis. The main features of such
a system are:
• High resolution leads to small width of each
peak and thus the decay of interest can be
selected with high specificity.
• High peak efficiency leads to large peaks and
small background, i.e. high signal-to-noise ra-
tio.
Although both high resolution and high peak effi-
ciency may be difficult to achieve in practice, one
should be aware of that better precision could be
obtained by using a detection system with such
properties. The spectrum in Figure A5 clearly
shows that analysis based on events in the Comp-
ton background will lead to multiple components
in the data.
6 Discussion on evaluation of data
It may be argued that an inspector would require
some automatic evaluation of the results from this
type of analysis. In the evaluation this type of
data, two situations can be foreseen:
• Operator-declared data of the fuel are availa-
ble.
• No operator-declared data are available.
If operator-declared data are available, measure-
ments can be used to verify these. The most im-
portant measurement property would then be the
precision in reconstructed relative activities for
normal rods. Even relatively small deviations
from operator-declared data would then be signifi-
cant and confident detection of removed or re-
placed rods would be expected.
However, if no operator-declared data are
available, the evaluation will have to be based on
deviations from average reconstructed activity
and on subjective apprehension of the reconstruct-
ed picture. There is a risk that such a procedure
may lead to erroneous statements. Some PWR
assemblies e.g. contain rods of depleted uranium
with a content of burnable absorbers, so called BA
rods. These are used for keeping the reactivity at
a desired level in the beginning of the fuel cycle
and generally obtain substantially lower activi-
ties than normal rods during operation. These
would likely be detected as removed or replaced,
although their presence is in accordance with
normal operation.
It may thus argued from a measurement point-
of-view that it is desirable to base tomographic
safeguard measurements on verification of opera-
tor-declared data.
7 Conclusions
The presented tomographic analysis method has
been applied on measurement data collected at
the Ringhals 4 nuclear power plant. The analyses
have clearly revealed five exchanged rods in the
measured fuel assembly. The average reconstruct-
ed activities of these have been between 6.0 and
7.4 S.D. lower than the average of the normal rods.
Also the water channels have been indicated,
with an average reconstructed activity 2.2 S.D.
lower than the normal fuel rods. However, the
precision has to be improved to allow for confident
detection.
It has been argued that a higher detection
level can be expected using a device where proper-
ties such as high positioning accuracy, detectors
with high peak efficiency and spectroscopic data
collection are easier to realise. The results indi-
cate that even the removal of a single, central rod
may be confidently detected provided that the
precision can be improved.
It has also been pointed out that the presence
of rods with significantly lower activities than
normal rods, e.g. BA rods of depleted uranium,
may be in accordance with normal operation. It
has therefore been argued from a measurement
point-of-view that it is desirable to base tomo-
graphic safeguard measurements on verification
of operator-declared data.
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